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Abstract: 
 This thesis, “Perceptions of Grandeur: Small States, Alliance Membership, and the 
value of Status Seeking”, focuses on examining the degree to which small states choose to 
pursue status-seeking within alliances. Considering the nature of contemporary alliances and 
organizations which directly confer material and ideological benefits upon their members, 
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), 
coercive mechanisms which end in the removal of the offending member or relinquishing all 
material and ideological benefits are not built into either alliance. As a result, most of the 
impetus for smaller states to invest heavily in accumulating status and showcasing their 
capabilities would rationally occur beforehand, garnering them enough status to enter the 
alliance and then benefit from the membership without contributing large amounts of support. 
This is not to say that small state leaders are greedier or disposed to free riding, but that small 
states would, in comparison to larger states, have fewer material resources to contribute to 
the alliance. Considering that and the importance of precluding free riding, determining the 
perceptions of small states regarding the value of alliance membership which leads to status-
seeking within them is a vital topic for those invested in the perpetuation and continued 
survival of alliances to examine. Additionally, unpacking the composition of small states in 
relation to one another is another salient area of focus, to more aptly understand how 
perceptions of status against one another as members of peer groups of similar states might 
impact their status-seeking within alliances. 
Alliance membership is also not as simplistic a proposition with the existence of 
alliances such as NATO and the EU, which, while not the same as one another, nevertheless 
overlap heavily with regards to their security pursuits and ideological stances. This nature 
and its applicability to the pursuit of alliance memberships ensures that overlapping 
dimensions of similar alliances need to be examined to best determine if status accumulation 
for a small state within both alliances did not occur in general, or if it changes occurred in 
status-seeking due to contributions being more heavily focused around supporting one 
alliance over another. The two states examined within this thesis, Estonia and Lithuania, 
while very similar small states in terms of their pursuit of NATO and EU membership, are 
distinguished not only by their status-seeking patterns within NATO (and to a lesser extent, 
  
the EU and the United Nations), but by their sizes in relation to one another when traditional 
status markers of gross domestic product and population are considered. Unpacking their 
perceptions of the value of status-seeking within alliances provides an important means of 
understanding not only which perceptions are more likely to lead to status-seeking within 
alliances, but how the comparative statuses of small states within peer groups also might 
influence perceptions.  
The analysis itself was predicated upon rectifying two reoccurring facets of academic 
analyses of status-seeking and small states. The first was a lack of comparison to other states, 
in favor of deeper analyses of single small states and their status-seeking patterns or 
comparing small states with large states in comparison to other relatively similar members in 
terms of relative size. The second stemmed from comparisons to other small states predicated 
upon examining singular potential theoretical explanations underpinning small state status-
seeking in alliances, such as the accumulation and usage of prestige as a result. Comparing 
Estonia and Lithuania as members of the same peer group, and relatively homogenous states 
in terms of overall size (but not in comparison to one another) and examining multiple 
theoretical explanations underpinning status-seeking for small states within alliances. These 
benefits included material ones, such as the provision of security guarantees through alliance 
membership or attaining prestige in the eyes of larger members of alliances, increasing the 
likelihood of garnering economic benefits or support for issues of national importance 
outside of the traditional realm of support guaranteed by the alliance. They also included 
ideological, less tangible benefits, such as membership as a means of promoting an identity 
predicated upon attaining the status associated with membership, or stigma management, 
wherein status-seeking in alliances served to preclude being externally perceived as a poor 
member or bad state actor and showing the capability to transform and meet expectations. 
A vital aspect of status-seeking which ensured that proceeding with analyses of these 
perceptions of alliance value is that status-seeking is not contrary to security-seeking or 
identity-seeking. Status-seeking in alliances (especially in NATO and the EU) confers both. 
The assurance that greater security guarantees exist for a state and their accumulation of 
greater material prowess confers a more desirable identity upon them in the form of 
  
developing a positive reputation as a powerful and capable state. Likewise, developing a 
more reputable and positive identity in the eyes of other states increases the likelihood of 
other states choosing to accept the more positively viewed state into alliances, out of a 
perceived belief that they will equitably contribute to the alliance. The goal of this research 
was then to determine what aspects of alliance membership were emphasized in publicly 
made statements from relevant political actors regarding their state’s alliance membership, if 
they reflected material benefits and goals such as security guarantees, or more ideological 
goals such as proving themselves capable of equitably contributing to alliance goals.  
To accomplish this, a qualitative content analysis of documents written by, and 
transcripts of speeches made by relevant domestic political elites regarding their and general 
alliance membership were analyzed. Three important factors influenced which were included 
in the qualitative content analysis. The first was that they had to be made and released to a 
wide audience. For this reason, transcriptions of speeches made at NATO and released by 
Lithuania’s Ministry of Defence, as well as articles from relevant Estonian political elites 
released through the Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook, were chosen as examples of 
reputable information intended for public consumption. Status-seeking is predicated upon 
changing and manipulating external perceptions of an action, meaning that meaningful 
attempts will be as visible and obvious as possible. The second was that they had to be at 
least one hundred words long, to preclude the potentiality of attempting to code a less formal 
and content-filled statement. The third was that they had to have specifically been made from 
a relevant domestic political elite, so direct transcripts or articles were necessary as compared 
to coverage of their position by a third party. This ensures that the statements coded 
originated directly from relevant domestic political figures and were not potentially skewed 
or mispresented through the interpretation of another party. 
The research conducted in this thesis was predicated upon the results of the qualitative 
coding frame alongside data available from NATO, ministries of defence, and the EU 
regarding personnel contributions to international missions, defence spending as a percentage 
of gross domestic product, and niche contributions through the development of centres of 
excellence (referred to as status accumulation) specifically, which aspect of the value of 
  
alliance membership (material or ideological, referred to as alliance valuation) led to 
increased status accumulation. In addition to these, academic analyses of aspects of status 
accumulation for Estonia and Lithuania, such as more specific research regarding their 
experiences within the International Security Assurance Force, were examined as well, to 
ascertain a more complete understanding of their experiences. This pursuit was not made due 
to the belief that the relevant domestic political elites were lying or misinformed, but rather 
that their status-seeking might not include all aspects of relevant information, or purposefully 
exclude information which might preclude their status-seeking efforts.  
The results of this research concluded that the hypothesized relationship between the 
perceived value of alliance membership and status-seeking for small states, wherein 
confluence between material and ideological goals indicates a greater likelihood of a small 
state pursuing consistent status-seeking. Even controlling for external events which occurred 
in specific periods of time during their membership, such as their original pursuit and initial 
attainment of membership and the actions of a resurgent Russia shows that consistency in 
status-seeking pursuits has more of an overall influence on status-seeking patterns. In terms 
of applicability to alliances, these results suggest that being perceived as having both aspects 
available as potential goals for status-seeking small states to achieve will lead to more 
equitable status-seeking than focusing more heavily upon material or ideological assurances.  
Two suggestions regarding potential future applications of the research conducted 
within this thesis include broadening the scope of documents indicating status-seeking 
originating from relevant domestic political elites included within the qualitative content 
analysis, more strongly pursuing interviews with other relevant domestic political elites. The 
first suggestion stems from the relative scarcity of pertinent documents and transcripts fit for 
the qualitative coding analysis: the one within this thesis features a total of 23 coded 
documents (13 from Estonian political elites, 10 from Lithuanian ones) which while not a 
non-considerable amount of statements to examine, nonetheless might not entirely 
encapsulate status-seeking statements made over the course of the fifteen years of 
membership within NATO and the EU experienced by both states. While expanding the 
scope of documents to be included within further qualitative content analyses might impact 
  
the validity of the information gathered, expanding what could be included while being 
mindful of their applicability to status-seeking and alliance membership for the small states 
in question would provide more content to analyze and hopefully provide a richer picture of 
alliance valuation expressed by small states. 
The second suggestion, the pursuit of interviews with relevant political elites, would 
provide more information both in terms of alliance valuation and for status accumulation 
practices. Some pertinent aspects of alliance valuation, such as prestige in the form of 
deepening relations between the United States and ensuring its support, were present in 
academic analyses of Estonian and Lithuanian perceptions of value regarding status-seeking 
in alliances but were largely not present in the results of the qualitative coding analysis. 
Pursuing interviews might help fill in the gaps of that alliance valuation, providing a greater 
amount of variation in determining what perceptions guided status-seeking efforts on the 
parts of small states. Additionally, some aspects of the examined status accumulation (such 
as niche contributions) had less information immediately available or officially provided. 
Interviews with relevant political actors would provide more insight into those contributions 
and a greater amount of relevant information regarding those aspects of status accumulation. 
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Introduction: 
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) are 
both noteworthy international organizations presenting both ideological and security benefits 
to their members. NATO, as a strong and stable pillar of the Euro-Atlantic community since 
the Cold War, represented both a phenomenal hard security guarantee with respect to Article 
5, wherein the liberal community it encapsulated would collective come to the aid of an 
attacked member. The EU likewise presented ideological and material benefits through the 
promise of increasingly unifying Europe and providing some security provisions under the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Both also largely lack commonly utilized 
means of enforcement against members who do not contribute, easing the potentiality of free-
rising for smaller members with less resources to spare (Goldstein, 1995, p. 40). Considering 
this fact and the relative homogeneity of small states within alliances, what leads some of 
them to risk larger amounts than their peers and contribute more to alliances and seek status 
within them? What perceived benefits lead them to make such large and seemingly 
unnecessary sacrifices to alliances? 
 This thesis will set out to discern motives for small states pursuing, or not as aptly 
pursuing, status-seeking within alliances by examining contributions from Estonia and 
Lithuania. Both states are largely similar small states as far as NATO and EU membership is 
concerned but are distinguished by their status-seeking strategies within NATO and their 
relative sizes as members of the same peer group (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015, pp. 12-13; 
Renshon, 2017, pp. 22-23; Graeger, 2014, p. 87). Determining what expressions of alliance 
value, whether they be due to material goals rising from ensuring the perpetuation of security 
or provision of additional support toward achieving some economic or national interest, or 
ideological ones centered around demonstrating their capabilities or overcoming stigma 
placed upon them, will be important for determining why small states choose to status-seek 
within alliances. Doing so will be critical for understanding what aspects of alliances are 
most important for encouraging small states to contribute more, potentially precluding the 
potentiality of free-riding within them. 
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 Several issues have arisen in studies of small state status-seeking within alliances. 
One such problem arises from a lack of consideration of multiple potential forms of benefits 
stemming from alliance membership, in favor of focusing on potential theoretical benefit of 
its pursuit (such as the accumulation of prestige) (Jakobsen, Ringsmose, & Saxi, 2018, pp. 
256-257). This pursuit curtails determining other potential explanations for status-seeking 
within alliances, limiting the potential scope of examining status-seeking. Another has 
stemmed from a lack of consideration of distinctions between small states within peer groups, 
contributing to a misleading perception of small states as almost entirely homogenous actors. 
Previous academic works have either focused upon deeper examinations of single states and 
their status-seeking within alliances, preventing comparisons from being made (Carvalho & 
Neumann, 2015, pp. 17-18), or, if comparisons have been made with regards to status-
seeking strategies, they have been between states with considerable differences in status and 
size (Jakobsen & Ringsmose, 2015, p. 135-136).  
This thesis seeks to address both problems through the establishment of a most-
similar systems design predicated upon comparing and distinguishing Estonia and Lithuania 
as similar but not homogenous members of the same peer group based upon traditional status 
indicators of size. Doing so will allow for a comparison of perceptions of alliance value and 
status-seeking patterns between two relatively similar small states, allowing for a more 
detailed examination of the appeal of alliance membership for small states and a distinction 
between how that appeal might differ within members of the same peer group. The 
hypothesized relationship between perceptions of alliance value and status-seeking for small 
states is that increased confluence between attaining material and ideological goals will lead 
to a greater amount of status-seeking. The caveat to this hypothesis is that different sized 
states might place more value on ideological benefits (if they are larger within the same peer 
group) or on material benefits (if they are smaller), leading to less status-seeking overall. 
To examine distinctions in the perceived value of the alliance (alliance valuation) 
over time between Estonian and Lithuanian actors, a qualitative coding analysis of transcripts 
and documents from relevant Baltic actors regarding the alliance and its benefits throughout 
their history will be conducted. These originated from transcripts of speeches given at NATO 
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events, articles written about the subject from relevant Estonian political elites within the 
Estonian Foreign Yearbook, and transcripts from Lithuania’s Ministry of Defence. 
Considering the difficulties associated with reliability and qualitative content analyses 
(ensuring that the conclusions reached by one researcher can be repeated), inter-coding 
reliability checks with two other persons were conducted, to gauge the results and ensure that 
the results were intelligible and replicable.  
Gauging degrees of status-seeking (status accumulation) pursued by Estonia and 
Lithuania in given years was first accomplished by establishing three pertinent means of 
accumulating status within their respective alliances: by contributing troops to international 
missions, spending money on defence with the goal of reaching the 2% Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) spending on defence espoused by NATO, and developing niche contributions 
through their respective centres of excellence. In addition to gathering data from relevant 
sites (websites for Ministries of Defence, data from NATO and the EU), academic articles 
relating to these status accumulation pursuits were examined. These allowed for a deeper 
analysis of the facets that went into status accumulation pursuits and provided more details 
regarding the events and environments within which Estonia and Lithuania found 
themselves. In addition to not covering every year of membership, viewing statements 
designed for public events might not allow insight into every event impacting the state the 
year that statement was made, either because the speaker did not want to specifically draw 
attention to it, or simply due to time constraints or a lack of information on their part. 
Examining these other sources of information in addition to the speaker’s depiction of events 
provides a means of filling those gaps in information and providing a better understanding of 
what underpinned their expressed alliance valuation. 
This thesis will be broken into four distinct chapters, as well as an introduction and a 
conclusion. The first chapter will be a literature review of literature pertaining to classical 
alliance theories (Walt, 1985; 1997; Goldstein, 1995), more contemporary examples of 
articles pertaining to small state status-seeking and status in general (Carvalho & Neumann, 
2015; Dafoe, Renshon, & Huth, 2014; Jakobsen, Ringsmose, & Saxi, 2018), and theories 
underpinning the two major goals of alliance valuation, material and ideological goals. These 
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include articles pertaining to alliance membership as sources of material benefits, such as 
security (Massie & Zyla, 2018; Pollard, 1923) and prestige ((Pedersen, 2017; Jakobsen et al., 
2018; Haugevik, 2015), and ideological benefits, such as identity promotion (Mitzen, 2006; 
Gibler, 2008) and stigma mitigation (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Zarakol, 2014). The second chapter 
will provide a much more detailed look at the methodology underpinning the research 
undertaken in this thesis, predicated in large part upon more deeply exploring alliance 
valuation with regards to the theories in chapter one. The third and fourth chapters will apply 
the methodology to Estonia and Lithuania, to discern their individual patterns of alliance 
valuation and status accumulation. The conclusion will examine what was similar and what 
was different between the two of them, and how accurate the hypothesized relationship 
between confluence in alliance valuation and status accumulation was. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Chapter One: Status-Seeking, Small States, and Alliances Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide an in-depth overview of the evolution of academic analyses 
of the value of alliance membership for small states. To properly analyze these historic trends, 
the first section of this chapter will examine earlier academic theories which ascribed value 
solely to security-seeking and survival and proceed alongside the developing literature to 
review status-seeking. The second section of this chapter will focus on the importance of 
alliances as a way for academic examinations of state pursuits of status-seeking. The third 
section examines the conceptualization of several key terms inherent to status-seeking 
(reputation, status, and prestige) throughout the literature. The fourth section deepens 
theoretical examinations of status-seeking and its inclusion of identity formation and stigma 
management as ideological goals for states status-seeking in alliances. The fifth and final 
section examines how the literature came to include small state status-seeking and 
accumulation within alliances, breaking away from previously held notions of only large 
states having the capacity to accumulate status and allowing for an examination of how and 
why it is pursued. 
Developing theoretical perspectives  
The premise underpinning security-seeking as the most important motivating factor 
for small states to join alliances was a realist assumption on the predominance of survival in 
an anarchic world system (Haugevik, 2015, p. 43). More classical interpretations of security-
seeking purposefully afford little to no active role to small states aside from responding to 
larger powers and their provocations (Reiter, 1994, p. 500), due to their general inability to 
act individually. Perspectives regarding small states within this view entirely subordinated 
them to greater states, with the continued survival of international society and sovereign 
small states accepted as either a show of mercy granted to smaller states from larger states, 
or from smaller states successfully playing the interests and “mutual jealousies” of larger 
states off one another (Pollard, 1923, pp. 54-55). Small state participation in alliances is then 
predicated not upon any sort of ideological factors or additional perceptions of alliance value, 
but the necessity of ensuring their survival from an immediate external threat. Within this 
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theoretical perspective, contributions to the alliance from a small state therefore only indicate 
their desire to survive and remain sovereign. The potential threat of other states within the 
alliance perceiving them as free-riders and refusing to come to their aid creates an unbearable 
security concern when the small state is faced with a grievous external threat, and alliance 
participation becomes a means to mitigate those concerns and ensure the provision of 
material benefits in the forms of concrete support (Goldstein, 1995, pp. 47-48; Massie & 
Zyla, 2018, p. 335).  
Security as provided through alliances is predicated on the chosen response to an 
external threat and the need to establish or maintain a balance of power. Small states, in 
pursuing security from this threatening power, can either balance with one another against 
the threat’s source, or bandwagon with the source of the threat (Walt, 1985, p. 4; Miller, 
2003, p. 52). The existence of a perceived threat is the determinant of an alliance’s 
establishment, with its nature and the decisions of small states to mitigate their insecurity 
against it forming the foundations of an alliance. An external threat is therefore necessary for 
an alliance to be maintained, with its reduction or termination leading to the alliance losing 
its reason to exist and breaking apart (Walt, 1997, p. 158; Barany & Rauchhaus, 2011, pp. 
286-288). Some additional areas of interest remained regarding alliance formation and 
maintenance, developing from other potentially salient variables such as the ideological 
importance of alliance membership and additional benefits awarded to certain alliance 
members (Walt, 1985, pp. 25-25, 27-29). Further analyses of these factors came an 
understanding of alliances as a way for states to measure, seek, and attain status through 
status-seeking, as opposed to only procuring increased security. 
Status-seeking and security-seeking, while distinguishable goals for states to pursue, 
do not diametrically oppose one another. Status confers, or is perceived to have the potential 
to confer, general benefits, even within a theory which presents an inextricably anarchical 
view of the world, by elevating a state above its competitors and making it more attractive 
for other states and small states to organize around (Renshon, 2017, pp. 8-9). This support 
can assume multiple forms from increasing the probability of successful alliance or 
international organization formation, facilitating economic, material, and security benefits 
for a state possessing enough status by establishing itself as an appealing actor on the global 
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stage (Gibler, 2008, p. 432; Miller, 2003, pp. 41-42). A state seeking to develop a positive 
reputation to increase its status, and thus standing, in an international hierarchy or procure 
membership in an alliance will likewise acquire the security associated with belonging to a 
larger community or alliance through its success. Conversely, even a state primarily seeking 
to accumulate security through the development and acquisition of military hardware will 
still accumulate status as a result, giving it, at the very least, a positive reputation as an 
increasingly capable power (Graeger, 2015, p. 87). Considering how status is conferred upon 
states attaining either ideological (normative successes, increase of position in hierarchy, 
etc.) or material (economic gains, security assurances, etc.), security-seeking can most 
appropriately be understood not as its own separate category, but rather a goal inherent to a 
broader understanding of what status-seeking entails. 
Status-seeking is predicated on the view of international society and alliances as 
founded upon hierarchical, and thus inherently unequal, relations between states and 
members of an organization or alliance. Classical scholars such as Machiavelli and Hobbes 
and their interpretations of international relations recognized the existence of status and its 
critical importance to states and their leaders in the forms of, among other things, “honor”, 
“glory”, and “standing” (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015, pp. 3, 6-7; Dafoe et al., 2014, p. 372). 
Even these predominantly anarchical views of the international system, largely spared the 
complexities and trappings of modern codified alliances, was predicated (at least in part) on 
the relationships states had with one another and the value of attaining and maintaining 
positive perceptions of themselves. Regardless of the lack of concrete relations ensured 
through alliance formation and diplomatic negotiations, nebulous ideas of some form of 
hierarchy nonetheless abounded, predominantly with regards to great powers struggling to 
maintain some sort of superiority over one another and inexorably attract smaller powers to 
aid them in warding off conflict or establishing material superiority over a competing power 
(Gibler, 2008, p. 432; Carvalho & Neumann, 2015, p. 2). Status-seeking, the internal pursuit 
of desirable traits by a state to gain positive reputation to attain status and its myriad of 
benefits, is a means of analyzing how states attain (or try to attain) status.  
Studying alliances and their composition provides an appropriate means of examining 
the salience of status-seeking for individual small states through their alliance contributions. 
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The most immediate benefit of alliances for analyzing status-seeking is the nature of alliance 
commitments in comparison to less formalized agreements: member-states possess a more 
concrete understanding of what membership contributions are meant to entail in comparison 
to other forms of diplomatic communication (Gibler, 2008, pp. 433-434), ensuring that their 
fulfillment or failure to ensure commitment does not arise due to misunderstandings or poor 
communication. Alliances are also crucially important and commonly examined subjects for 
the study of international relations and the states within. This significance to the discipline 
stems from both their ubiquitous nature as a means of constructing a broadly encompassing 
foreign policy with other states, and their importance as early signals for developing security 
concerns and, potentially, the outbreak of conflict between groups of states (Miller, 2003, p. 
51; Reiter, 1994, p. 490). One facet of status-seeking which must be addressed is the 
incredibly broad encapsulation of concepts such as reputation, status, and prestige under 
broader and often interchangeable terminology within status-related research. These terms 
are not interchangeable and determining what distinctions exist between them will be critical 
for appropriately examining status and the many reasons potentially underpinning its value. 
Conceptualizing Reputation, Status, and Prestige 
While reputation, status, and prestige are closely related when applied to states, their 
conceptualization precludes them from being interchangeable terms for the same phenomena. 
Reputation refers to the external perception of a state based upon historical trends and 
behaviors that it has exhibited, and how other states view it in comparison to themselves and 
as a singular actor (Dafoe et al., 2014, pp. 372-373, 375). Its pursuit and maintenance has 
driven states and their leaders to go to exceptional lengths to ensure its defence, for fear of 
developing a more negative reputation which might curtail the effectiveness of future 
political actors (Gibler, 2008, pp. 427-428; Miller, 2003, pp. 41-42). Reputation does not 
necessarily have to be relational or positive and can take several different forms or traits for 
individual states, such as developing reputations for possessing resolve, honesty, or multiple 
forms of reputation simultaneously (Ibid, pp. 41, 47; Gibler, 2008, pp. 429-430). 
Additionally, reputation does not necessarily have to be universally constant across all 
external actors. Multiple reputations for an individual state can exist among those perceiving 
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it externally, increasing the difficulty of determining a relatively homogenous reputation that 
a state may possess (Dafoe et al., 2014, p. 374). While reputation cannot exist without other 
states and their perceptions, forms of it and their applicability to a single state can be 
determined without directly drawing comparisons between multiple states. This 
characteristic, alongside the less positively associated aspects of reputation, most strongly 
distinguishes it from status. 
In its simplest terms, status is a form of reputation which is contingent upon 
comparison to external sources. It is predominantly focused upon the perception of a state’s 
reputation and outside perception among its peers or another closely related social group 
(Renshon, 2017, p. 4; Massie & Zyla, 2018, p. 325; Jakobsen, Ringsmose, & Saxi, 2018, p. 
261; Pedersen, 2017, p. 220). It provides a means for states to hierarchically position 
themselves in comparison to allies, neighbors, alliance members, or a targeted reference 
group with some shared common characteristics (Dafoe et al., 2014, pp. 378-379). Identity 
formation and confirmation through status is also a noteworthy end achieved through the 
procurement of status, with its attainment potentially confirming membership to an 
international organization or alliance (Renshon, 2017, p. 4). Even assuming that a state may 
not hold some degree of status within a specific group, their status will nonetheless determine 
their general position as an international actor, for example, their perception as a “great” or 
“minor” power. Their status may also place them within a peer group (or status community) 
of similar states, whether objectively determined groups of states connected to one another 
regionally, or subjectively determined groups of peers (such as the BRICS), at once ordering 
the world and placing those specific states within a hierarchy (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015, 
pp. 12-13; Renshon, 2017, pp. 22-23). 
Status, due to its inherently relational characteristics, produces a zero-sum 
hierarchical stratification of states and their status-based relationships with one another: when 
one state’s status increases or diminishes, it will always be in relation to other states, whose 
own status will diminish or increase in comparison (although the distinction may be 
negligible, depending on the size and formation of the group) (Dafoe et al., 2014, p. 375). 
The ultimate goal of status is the cultivation of a positive reputation, allowing for a state to 
12 
 
stand out and above its neighbors, groups, or in the broadest possible sense within the 
international community, a process eased for smaller states by virtue of their small size, 
which lowers expectations among larger powers and eases their status-seeking woes 
(Pedersen, 2017, p. 221; Jakobsen & Ringsmose, 2015, p. 136). The benefits of cultivating 
status are multi-faceted and subject to further academic investigation, especially considering 
the strategic flaws which may present themselves in the process of status-seeking: despite the 
strong relationship between status-seeking and security provision within a military alliance, 
pursuing status can preclude the attainment of security assurances, with its pursuit potentially 
causing states to take greater risks or expose themselves to more insecurity to ensure its 
provision (Jakobsen et al., 2018, pp. 262-263; Renshon, 2017, pp. 15-16). Considering these 
potential detriments, further research into potential reasons underpinning the desirability of 
status-seeking for individual small states within alliances was conducted. One material 
benefit from status-seeking, prestige, focuses on the implication of status as a means of 
accumulating tangible benefits from other states and ensuring some reward from their risks. 
Prestige, the utilization of status to attain material benefits, aid, or other diplomatic 
and social capital, examines reputation and the attainment of status as a means to achieving 
some manner of strategic or resource-driven goal. The analysis of prestige as an end-result 
of attaining status originally was constrained to the behavior of larger states. The belief 
underpinning that theoretical development was that only greater powers would be able to 
utilize prestige to protect their own interests, due to their comparatively insurmountable 
advantages in terms of resources and other material wealth in comparison to smaller states. 
Those lesser powers, lacking similar capabilities and the means to develop it, would 
essentially be locked out of utilizing their status for similar purposes (Jakobsen et al., 2018, 
p. 260; Renshon, 2017, p. 14). Prestige as a perceived goal for small states in alliances, 
however, has become a more viable topic to examine among contemporary researchers. The 
major impetus behind the change came from further discerning how prestige could be utilized 
by smaller states in a distinctive, yet still materially beneficial, manner from larger states.  
In comparison to larger states enshrining their interests through utilizing prestige to 
persuade smaller states, smaller states could utilize prestige accumulated through status-
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seeking with larger powers to attain concessions from them or obtain greater political access 
to politicians from large states for the pursuit of their national interests (Pedersen, 2017, pp. 
218-219; Jakobsen et al., 2018, pp. 257-258, 262-263; Haugevik, 2015, p. 44). Prestige 
accumulation, as applied to small states within alliances, postulates that status-seeking is a 
means to an end. That end is the procurement of diplomatic capital (goodwill which leads to 
greater political access and the potential to influence the decision-making of other states) 
(Adler-Nissen, 2008, p. 670) and material benefits by improving a small state’s status and 
perceived value in the eyes of larger states the ultimate goal (Jakobsen et al., 2015, pp. 257-
258). The acquisition of these benefits, alongside the provision of security accompanying 
diminished concerns of alliance abandonment, provide two valuable perspectives on the 
value of status-seeking for small states within alliances to acquire material benefits. 
However, research on the potential value of alliance membership for small states does not 
universally end with the consideration of material benefits but continues to examine other 
potential benefits which may arise. 
Identity formation and stigma management as ideological goals  
Academic analyses of the reasons underpinning status-seeking find that other forms 
of benefits exist for states which are not as strictly focused upon material benefits (although 
those benefits can certainly be achieved as well). A large part of this continued analysis was 
predicated on the distinctions between states and their alliance making decisions in similar 
circumstances. Despite a relatively large amount of homogeneity regarding the composition 
of states in certain and their perceptions of external threats, distinctions existed between the 
choices they made when joining alliances (Reiter, 1994, p. 226). Exploring potential reasons 
led to a resurgence of the necessity to study status-seeking not as a means to an end, but as 
an end to itself, as a means of allowing a state to position itself on the global stage. These 
ideological considerations were explored to an extent in earlier literature as curious 
adventures which threatened domestic material interests, ultimately demonstrating little more 
than displays of irrationality on the part of leaders which could lead only to further insecurity 
and conflict (Haugevik, 2015, p. 44; Dafoe et al., 2014, p. 379; Renshon, 2017, pp. 11, 18-
19). Whether these decision-making processes fit into models of realist rational state behavior 
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or not was not as concerning as discerning the potential motivations for pursuing an 
ideological end for its own sake, and the inherent value to a state developing a greater status. 
Status-seeking and the accumulation of positive reputation as a result is enormously 
beneficial for states looking for membership among a specific and subjective peer group by 
altering the beliefs of others to match their internal perceptions of themselves (Renshon, 
2017, pp. 23-24). Additionally, and especially for small states, alliance membership allows 
for these smaller states to prove their ideological strength by promoting themselves as 
morally “good” states, modeling exemplary behavior for the rest of the world to strive to 
adhere to (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015, pp. 10-11). These benefits, while also potential 
avenues to obtain material gains as a result, are predominantly predicated on achieving 
ideological aims because of status-seeking. This pursuit most frequently takes two forms: 
identity building, wherein status-seeking is a means for a state to make external perceptions 
match internal perceptions, and stigma management, predicated more upon concerns over 
accumulating negative reputation. 
Identity building occurs alongside the codification of the world associated with 
alliance membership. Entering an alliance, as expressed in earlier academic theories 
discussing alliances as providing a balance of power, is a means for security procurement 
from like-minded states against an external threat. In tandem with this provision of security 
is the potentiality of joining a community which represents a desirable social community of 
positively perceived states (Barnett, 1996, p. 401). While the degree to which belonging to 
an alliance-based community might impact a state’s decision to pursue membership in one 
has been contested (Waltz, 1985, p. 26), an alliance creating some sort of community for its 
member-states is unquestionable: communication between members of an alliance is 
expected for a member to join and maintain their membership (Gibler, 2008, p. 433), ensuring 
that some form of relationship developing between the members, at the very least, within the 
context of maintaining the alliance and positive relations with one another, inevitable. This 
communication theoretically also has the capacity to transcend alliance maintenance, creating 
a simplified field for dialogue between member states and easing the process of creating and 
deepening their diplomatic ties to one another (Mitzen, 2006, pp. 344-345).  
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A state gaining membership to an alliance also provides confirmation of attaining a 
specific status. Considering the nature of alliances as bringing together states which hold 
certain characteristics, obtaining membership to an alliance of attractive peers can signify a 
state’s attainment of an equivalent status to other members within that group (Renshon, 2017, 
p. 23). Previously held theories viewed alliance membership in the face of a threat to be 
inevitable, with neutrality an unacceptable choice for a small state to make. Neutrality was 
viewed not as a strategic decision for a small state to pursue, but as equivalent to 
bandwagoning with the source of the threat by not combating the source of insecurity (Reiter, 
1994, p. 495). Ideological solidarity as another motivating factor for small states to join and 
maintain alliances would indicate a reason for this seemingly peculiar choice. The fulfillment 
of an ideal related to identity through an appropriate alliance would be a powerful 
determinant for pursuing membership over neutrality, and vice-versa if such solidarity could 
not be found (Walt, 1997, pp. 168-169). Viewing this paradigm outside previously held 
notions of the value of alliance membership for small states therefore allows for an 
examination not of how irrationality might play out in alliances, but the value of a certain 
alliance to a small state as a means of indicating a form of ideological fulfillment and the 
attainment of a positive identity (Haugevik, 2015, p. 44). In this case, the actions of the small 
state are a means of reinforcing and indicating their status through procuring good reputation, 
but the inverse, status-seeking as a means of preventing the accumulation of negative 
reputation to preserve (or regain) status and prevent stigmatization, also exists as an 
important ideological end. 
A final possible goal for states pursuing status-seeking is as a means of managing 
stigma because of developing negative reputation within a peer group. Developed from the 
English school’s perception of the world as an international society predicated upon frequent 
communication between states (Adler-Nissen, 2014, pp. 147-149), the key idea underpinning 
stigma management is that norms develop within a community, and members will recognize 
transgressions and castigate the offender. Stigma management differs from identity 
promotion as a strategy more closely interwoven with the actor’s desire to avoid shaming 
and other deleterious consequences due to violating norms considered to be of paramount 
importance to a peer group (Ibid, pp. 143-144). Stigmatization in international politics occurs 
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through the creation of stigma in relation to the behaviors within a collection of states. 
Members of an alliance, international organization, or other group of closely interrelated 
states develop norms and attitudes toward behaviors which are both considered normal and 
acceptable, and, at the very least, known by all and developed into a shared common social 
ground (Zarakol, 2014, p. 314). Stigma stems from actors within the group recognizing the 
actions of another as violating those values held in common, leading to their stigmatizing the 
misbehaving actor by publicly castigating them in the hopes of causing them to alter their 
behavior and ensure future compliance (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 148). This process ends in 
stigmatization if the misbehaving actor understands that they are misbehaving in some way. 
Their reaction does not always necessitate altering their behavior to ensure compliance (other 
strategies do exist, such as accepting such deviant behavior as a core aspect of their identity) 
(Ibid, p. 172), their understanding that the action was perceived as unacceptable within the 
group is critical for stigmatization to have occurred (Zarakol, 2014, pp. 314, 318-319). 
While opting out of the specific peer group and joining another to avoid developing 
a negative reputation and diminished place in the group’s hierarchy is an option (Dafoe et al., 
2014, p. 379), choosing instead to remain within the group (especially in the case of small 
states and alliances facing a strong external threat, who may not perceive another option) 
necessitates some strategic maneuvering. The pursuit of stigmatizing misbehaving actors is 
therefore particularly useful both as a means of punishment without relying on more material 
forms of castigation, and as a way of reinforcing the organizational structure of the group. 
Regardless of the reaction of the state being stigmatized, the matter becoming officially 
presented and reacted to emphasizes the group’s composition and the importance of the value 
in question (Zarakol & Mattern, 2016, p. 640). This management could, depending upon 
specific situations, be an exceptionally prominent and negative identity-based motivator. It 
would contingent not merely upon domestic attempts from small states to enshrine an identity 
for themselves within a peer group, but upon the perceived necessity of preventing their 
perception from noteworthy actors within the community from becoming predicated upon 
negative connotations. Recognition of the necessity to avoid such outcomes by pursuing 
stigma management may play a significant role in determining why small states within 
alliances may status-seek (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p 153). 
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Security, prestige, identity, and stigma management are all potential reasons as to 
why small states pursue status-seeking in alliances. Those four explanations essentially deal 
with two larger groups of concerns, which, while largely interrelated to one another, do 
represent varied goals, specifically the pursuit of ideological and material goals. Ideological 
goals, wherein status-seeking predicated upon ensuring recognition within a peer group of 
states and the potential procurement of normative benefits stemming from its attainment, are 
exemplified by identity and stigma management explanations. Material goals view status-
seeking within an alliance as a means to an end, that end being ensuring security and 
additional material benefits in the future, exemplified by security and prestige explanations. 
A final, vital topic which largely escaped greater discussion in more classic forms of literature 
is the ways smaller states can accumulate status within alliances. The goals explored earlier 
provide a multiplicity of potential reasons underscoring its pursuit, but the form which such 
status-seeking might take for smaller states is likewise a critically important subject. 
On this subject, more traditional explorations and views of status-seeking fall short. 
Due to previously held notions of status-seeking being reserved to larger states as the only 
powers great enough to distinguish themselves, researching how status is accumulated by 
states seeking it has been limited. One such form is procuring weaponry and material 
capabilities with highly symbolic value, leading to status-seeking research which examines 
status accumulation based upon states acquiring nuclear capabilities and purchasing aircraft 
carriers (Renshon, 2017, pp. 15-17). Failing to move beyond such a research design would 
be innately self-defeating, doing little more than regulating the study of status-seeking to the 
most economically prominent states within the international system and again rendering 
smaller states as homogenous and vestigial entities in comparison. The goal of status-seeking 
is not to pursue internally-derived solutions to accumulate status (considering the lesser 
capabilities of smaller states, this would be impossible), but rather to increase their visibility 
to members of the alliance by having their contributions be recognized (Jakobsen et al., 2018, 
p. 263), enabling smaller states to attain some ideological or material goals. 
Status-seeking as applied to small states within alliances is derived more from 
meeting commitments and their forms of contributions. Two factors significantly ease the 
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process of making this status-seeking not only visible but quantifiable. The first is the nature 
of alliances as ones which require firm commitments which are agreed upon by the small-
state prior to its entry. These agreements ensure that expectations for appropriately 
contributing are known to all involved actors (Gibler, 2008, pp. 433-434), making it possible 
for small states to accumulate status by meeting or exceeding those commitment goals, which 
can include procuring materials for defence, personnel contributions to international 
missions, and other forms of niche contributions (Graeger, 2015, pp. 86, 88). Second is the 
more modest expectations placed upon small states due to their more limited resources: 
status-seeking is greatly eased by their smaller size, making it easier to exceed the 
expectations of other alliance members and larger states (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015, p. 2; 
Jakobsen et al., 2018, p. 263). Small states seeking status in alliances then have the means to 
do so not by purchasing symbolically loaded weaponry or defence materials, but in ensuring 
that their contributions are as visible as possible and predicated upon the needs and desires 
of the alliance. 
Numerous potential goals have been researched in the literature on the value of status 
as explanations predicating small-states pursuing status-seeking in alliances through 
contributing to the strength of the alliance and distinguishing themselves as members. In 
doing so, the groundwork has been laid for analyzing what forms of alliance valuation are 
most salient for making status accumulation a desirable goal for small states. More 
effectively examining these theories as they apply to small state status-seeking in alliances 
will require establishing appropriate case studies to determine how these alternative goals 
apply to small states within alliances.  
Conclusion 
This thesis will additionally address two weaknesses of the literature reviewed and 
studies of reasons underpinning status accumulation. One has been the lack of comparative 
studies of multiple small states within similar peer groups, in favor of either deeply 
examining single small states and their status-seeking (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015, pp. 17-
18), or states with larger disparities in their respective statuses (Jakobsen & Ringsmose, 2015, 
p. 135-136). The other has been, in literature wherein similar peer group states and their status 
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accumulation patterns are explored, a more specific focus on a singular alliance valuation 
reason underpinning its pursuit (Jakobsen et al., 2018, pp. 256-257), precluding other factors 
which might also factor into small state status accumulation patterns. To further explore this 
topic, this thesis will examine the Baltic states as relatively homogenous actors within their 
peer group, and otherwise distinguished actors with regards to their alliance contributions, to 
determine which factors differentiate alliance valuation and status-seeking pursuits among 
small states. The next chapter focuses on conceptualizing and distinguishing small states, 
how they express their perceptions of the value of alliance membership, and how they 
accumulate status within alliances themselves. Additionally, an appropriate methodology for 
determining a means to measure and compare alliance valuation and status accumulation 
between small states will be established and expanded upon. 
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Chapter Two: Conceptualization and Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter will conceptualize the variables to be examined within this thesis. 
Alliance valuation, the independent variable, will be gleaned from a qualitative content 
analysis of transcripts and documents from relevant Estonian and Lithuanian political elites 
to determine patterns in perceptions of alliance membership and status-seeking within it 
fulfilling material goals versus identity goals. Status accumulation, the dependent variable, 
will be determined by examining three vital indicators of the pursuit of status-seeking, 
international mission personnel contributions, defence spending as a percentage of GDP, and 
niche contributions. The first section of this chapter will determine the value of examining 
the Baltic states through a most similar systems design as a means of determining their 
similarities and finding the most pertinent point of distinction between them.  
The Most-Similar Systems Design 
As established within the literature review, alliance membership provides a 
particularly valuable frame of reference with regards to analyzing the value and reasons 
underpinning status-seeking for small states. The label itself, however, is one that demands 
a comparison group to be readily understood, as a state cannot be considered a certain size 
without another state with which to compare it to. Should the size of a state be best compared 
to the entirety of the global community, to the alliance within which they reside, or another 
measure entirely? Status-seeking theories ascertain the value of another option entirely, 
specifically, subjective and objective social communities within which a state may reside. 
Objective peer groups are ones linked to one another by geographical considerations, 
subjective peer groups by perception and ideological factors (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015, 
p. 12; Renshon, 2018, pp. 22-23). The Baltic states would qualify as a peer group by both 
metrics. They are objectively tied to one another via their location between the Baltic sea and 
Russia, and subjectively tied to one another through strong internal and external perceptions 
of themselves as forming a tightly-knit group of similar and allied states within the larger 
global community (Medijainen, 2012, pp. 183, 197-198; “Declaration on Unity and 
Cooperation”, 1990).  
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Not only do the Baltic states exist within a single peer group (both subjectively or 
objectively ordered), they also share a common historic threat and security-related reason to 
pursue alliance membership through their foreign policy history with Russia. Their previous 
and unwilling entrance into the Soviet Union left them with two enduring factors which 
impacted their decision to pursue membership in NATO and the EU. The first is their security 
relationship with Russia, both due to historical tensions and perceived risk stemming from 
its proximity and military presence (Shetty, Kearns, & Lunn, 2012, pp. 5-7), which provided 
a strong impetus for foreign policy decisions following the end of the Cold War (Ilves, 2007, 
p. 11). The second is the vital nature of the Euro-Atlantic community and the United States 
as sources of ideological solidarity, with closer relations proving the identity of Baltic states 
as free and democratic states capable of upholding globally ubiquitous values (Valionis, 
2004).  
Despite these similarities and how historic policies have led to the peaceful 
cooperation between them, the Baltic states are far from homogenous entities. The notion of 
a singular Baltic identity and the implications of cohesive unity stemming as a result has been 
received with some consternation, with individual Baltic states taking actions specifically to 
unpin perceptions of themselves from their neighbors as comprising only one state within a 
homogeneous Baltic identity (Mockutė, 2008, pp. 11-12, 36-37; Paulauskas, 2005, pp. 52-
55). These desires to distinguish themselves from their neighbors impacted the Baltic states’ 
pursuit of membership within the EU and NATO, with internal diplomatic tensions 
periodically arising over which state would take leadership over hosting Baltic defence 
cooperation projects (Ibid, pp. 53-54). These considerations for their comparative statuses, 
especially with regards to their prospects as NATO and EU membership candidates, fit the 
model for status-seeking as a means of seeking a more favorable position when compared to 
relevant others (Pedersen, 2018, p. 219). While the Baltic community was overemphasized 
as a homogenous one, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania nonetheless, even as they deepened 
their cooperation in pursuit of NATO membership, competed with one another with 
considerations to their statuses.  
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A less traditional form of status marker for distinguishing state size also exists, 
specifically, the examination of state size as relational to the perceptual and preference sizes 
of the examined states (Thorhallsson, 2006, p. 8). Perceptual size refers to the domestic 
perception of the size of the state and its capabilities for acting meaningfully internationally 
(Ibid, pp. 24-25), and preference size delineates their ambitions and desired status (for 
example, if they desire and realistically strive to achieve great power status) (Ibid, pp. 26-
27). In these regards, the Baltic states once again are relatively homogenous. All three viewed 
themselves as small, vulnerable, yet capable states following the end of the Cold War. The 
pursuit of membership in NATO and the EU was therefore both a necessity for ensuring that 
they could rebuild their economies and remain secure, and a possibility that was well within 
their capacities to eventually attain (Paulauskas, 2013, pp. 50-51). 
Examining the Baltic states does highlight a critical point of contention between them, 
namely, their varying sizes (in terms of traditional status markers) in comparison to one 
another. While all three are typically considered small states in relation to (and often 
alongside) many of their fellow members in NATO (Urbelis, 2015, pp. 70-71), clear 
distinctions exist in their size in comparison to one another. Defining what qualifies a state 
as a small state is far from a universally decided and quantified measure, and a plethora of 
terminology labeling states as medium and major states, or regional and great powers among 
others (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015, p. 13; Renshon, 2017, pp. 16-17) illustrate the numerous 
theoretical attempts to distinguish the characters of states from one another in terms of size. 
One aspect of these size labels is that they, much like status, are relational: for a state to be a 
“large” state or “great” power, there must be other examples of states which fail to develop 
such a reputation, and vice-versa. Fittingly, traditional deliberations of status predicated upon 
the size of a state are most concerned with economic strength and access to natural resources 
stemming from their population and the geographic size of their sovereign territory (Graeger, 
2014, p. 87). Immediate and uninterrupted access to differing amounts of these critical 
resources determines the effective size of the state, with smaller states being less capable of 
accessing them than larger states. 
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Their peer group membership, coupled with external perceptions of a dangerous other 
in Russia, their internal perceptual and preference sizes, and the desirability of proving their 
ideological strength and European identity through increased cohesion with the Euro-Atlantic 
community (Paulaskas, 2013, p. 49), would provide similar reasons underpinning status-
seeking. A pertinent research puzzle arises when considering their alliance contributions and 
status-seeking within NATO. As homogenous as the Baltic states appear to be via a cursory 
inspection, their similarities fall short of precluding any meaningful differences from 
developing, as their paths and status-seeking strategies within NATO have varied 
considerably. Two research questions within the research puzzle arise based upon this 
observation. To what extent does the perceived value of status-seeking in an alliance differ 
for the largest state compared to the smallest in a peer group of small states? And if 
perceptions do differ, which perceptions of status-seeking value (ideological or material) 
within an alliance lead to more status-seeking, and does the size of the small state in the peer 
group lead to a difference in which perceptions lead to status-seeking?  
Re-evaluating Baltic states based on their size (measured by access to traditional 
status indicators, access to economic and natural resources) reveals larger distinctions 
between all three of them, and the largest distinctions in terms of those status-related 
indicators of size are Estonia and Lithuania. Numerous common factors are shared between 
them, such as their peer group membership and similar views of Russia as a large historical 
(and potentially contemporary) security threat. Additionally, both found the value of NATO 
and EU membership vital and ascended to both bodies in the same year (Shetty et al., 2012, 
pp. 3, 15), ensuring that no variation exists with regards to their time as fully-fledged 
members within each organization. The sizes of Estonia and Lithuania, as understood by the 
status markers, presents a much larger and salient point of distinction between them. 
Measuring their respective sizes based on those indicators since regaining independence in 
1991 illustrates the size difference which has consistently distinguished Estonia and 
Lithuania from one another. While Estonia’s population has remained more stable than 
Lithuania’s (which only dwindled to 1.3 million in 2017 compared to 1.5 million in 1991), 
Lithuania’s population has remained constantly and noticeably larger than Estonia’s, despite 
dropping more significantly from ust over 3.7 million in 1991 to approximately 2.8 million 
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in 2017 (World Bank, 2019a). Their respective GDPs have fared better following 
independence, climbing from $4 and $7 billion in 1991 to $25 and $47 billion in 2017 (for 
Estonia and Lithuania respectively) (Ibid, 2019b), and the physical size of their states has 
remained constant. Estonia’s territorial size is smaller than Lithuania’s at 45.2 thousand 
square kilometers, in comparison to Lithuania’s 65.3 thousand (Nestor et al., 2016, p. 6). 
Latvia’s position within the Baltic states as another potential case study would be less 
appropriate for determining size as a factor in status-seeking within a peer group, as its 
distinctions between Estonia and Lithuania are not as significant as theirs are between one 
another. An additional and critical factor inherent to Estonia and Lithuania as status-seekers 
among the Baltic peer group is their greater sensitivity, due to their geographic positions, on 
foreign policy developments outside of the Baltic region. Estonia and Lithuania were both 
more directly exposed to foreign policy developments, such as the growth of German and 
Soviet influence in the years leading up to World War 2 (Männik, 2013, p. 19), and as a 
result, sought (with extremely varying degrees of success, particularly regarding Lithuania’s 
relations with Poland) greater cooperation with their non-Baltic neighbors (Medijainen, 
2012, p. 188). It would be erroneous to argue that Latvia did not also pursue developing 
foreign policy and relations with states outside of the Baltic states, as for example, the United 
States has been perceived as an enormously vital source of support for all three Baltic states 
(Männik, 2013, p. 29). Latvia’s position in between Estonia and Lithuania did, to an extent, 
preclude the development of policies which did not take its immediate and unavoidable 
neighbors into account. Fittingly, its security vision between regaining independence and 
attaining NATO membership heavily focused on developing further cooperation with the 
other Baltic states (Ibid, pp. 24-25). Estonia and Lithuania’s security visions before joining 
NATO likewise ascribed enormous benefits to attaining membership but placed heavier 
emphasis on working to develop their own security and cooperation with neighboring Nordic 
countries and Poland respectively, and were less willing than Latvia to depend entirely upon 
NATO’s collective security (Ibid, pp. 26-29). 
Determining Alliance Valuation and Status Accumulation 
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The independent variable to be examined in this article is the perceived value of 
alliance membership as a viable platform to pursue status-seeking to Lithuania and Estonia 
(alliance valuation), specifically, what aspects of the characteristics of NATO are stressed 
and to which degrees of frequency over time. The hypothesized relationship is that the 
increased confluence of alliance valuation between material and ideological goals for small 
states will lead to a larger amount of status accumulation, with perceptions substantially 
favoring material or ideological benefits over the other leading to less status accumulation. 
For Estonia and Lithuania, this distinction stems from their distinctions in size, as defined 
via status-related economic and material resources. One of the best possible illustrations of 
this distinction can be found in their respective security visions before joining NATO: While 
Estonia placed a fairly sizeable degree of importance on the security and stability of all three 
Baltic states, Lithuania placed its own preservation into a more important category than 
ensuring the stability of the rest of its respective peer group, to the point of Lithuanian 
politicians viewing entry into NATO alongside Poland as equally or more desirable than joint 
entry with the rest of the Baltic states (Ibid, p. 29). For Estonia, the stability of the rest of the 
Baltic states was necessary for ensuring the best possible security environment, for Lithuania, 
there was more of an internally perceived capacity for the state to attain security without 
relying as heavily upon the rest of the Baltic states to survive or provide aid should a 
hypothetical crisis occur. 
To test the degree to which this hypothesis applies via the cases of Estonia and 
Lithuania, a qualitative data analysis will be applied to statements originating from pertinent 
elite actors from both Baltic states. This will provide a means of determining the degree and 
presence of alliance valuation, through analyzing the existence of patterns and the presence 
of pertinent theoretical categories in the collected qualitative data (Saldaña, 2013, pp. 3-4, 
14). A noticeable caveat is that status-seeking is done as publicly and noticeably, with the 
aim of ensuring that as large and pertinent an audience as possible is aware of the actions 
undertaken to impact perceptions of the status-seeking state (Renshon, 2017, p. 24; Dafoe et 
al., 2014, p. 376). As such, the statements examined in the qualitative content analysis were 
selected with an important qualification in mind, namely, their intended audience. Due to the 
public nature of status-seeking, the statements selected had to be ones intended for 
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consumption by the public and larger audiences. While statements made from Baltic states 
regarding the alliance and its value (or shortcomings) without such concerns certainly have 
been made over the course of their membership (Traynor, 2010), the higher visibility of 
status-seeking precludes the value of including such statements in the data, even if they were 
uniformly possible to find.  
The statements examined within the data analysis include transcribed statements and 
responses from Estonian and Lithuanian political elites made at press points and political 
functions performed at NATO meetings and related events. Supplementing statements made 
at NATO related functions are official statements released from Lithuanian and Estonian 
political elites via the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence and the Estonian Foreign 
Policy Yearbook (published by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) which are primarily 
predicated upon their respective countries experiences in the alliance. All the qualitative 
coding analysis performed has been directed at the specific transcriptions or information 
provided by the specific actor. This precludes the possibility of examining news articles or 
other sources of information summarizing what the relevant actor said, which will control for 
the possibility of bias entering the summary predicated upon potential biases held by the 
individual summarizing the information, or limitations inherent to presenting it through the 
lenses of another party. 
These statements may not necessarily be indicative of all the information 
underpinning an experience Estonia and (or) Lithuania had at a point in time, due to a plethora 
of potential reasons such as an unwillingness to potentially offend other alliance members or 
a simple lack of knowledge on the part of the speaker. To fill in these gaps and provide as 
accurate a summation of their experiences as possible, academic articles relating to Estonia 
and Lithuania’s experiences and developments over the course of their alliance membership 
will be examined (although not as parts of the qualitative coding frame) alongside the data 
gleaned from statements. The aim of this qualitative content analysis is to determine which 
perceptions of the alliance and its relationship to their country were expressed by domestic 
actors from Estonia and Lithuania when status-seeking via contributions were (or were not) 
pursued. Of the two greater explanations underpinning status-seeking and status 
27 
 
accumulation (ideological, which is concerned with normative factors underpinned by 
identity and stigma management, or material, predicated upon security concerns and 
additional material benefits gained through prestige), which expressed perspectives occurred 
most frequently for Estonia or Lithuania?  
The dependent variable, status accumulation, is the degree and form of status-seeking 
pursued via alliance contributions from Estonia and Lithuania through participation in 
international missions, development of niche contributions, and defence spending as a 
percentage of GDP. NATO faces a broad and expansive number of security challenges 
because of its relatively contemporary (with consideration to the length of time the alliance 
has existed) shift away from confronting the Soviet Union to pursuing alternative security 
pursuits (Hartley & Sandler, 1999, p. 665). As a result, examining contributions made by 
member states to the alliance cannot simply be reduced to analyzing the raw financial support 
they provide. Such a reductive study of contributions would reveal little other than the 
economic strength and size of the country in question, indicating nothing that might be 
relevant regarding that state’s pursuit of status-seeking within the alliance. This paradigm 
becomes even less helpful when examining smaller states within the alliance, with even the 
considerable differences between Estonia and Lithuania leading to little meaningful 
difference in terms of financial support for the alliance. While spending will be analyzed as 
a means of pursuing status-seeking, this thesis will continue and examine it along two other 
salient forms of contributions to NATO: defence spending as a percentage of GDP, troop 
participation in international missions, and support in the form of developing unique niche 
capabilities. These forms of contributions are meaningful enough to potentially attract some 
favorable status within the alliance (in the form of endangering security forces and 
committing other material resources) and broad enough to provide an additional degree of 
certainty with regards to the full spectrum of forms of status-seeking which are pursued or 
neglected. 
While not desirable for the purposes of an academic analysis, attempts to reduce 
indicators to provide a semblance of easily-understandable comprehensibility for 
contributions are nonetheless incredibly salient among state politicians and the public alike. 
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Stripping away the complexity underpinning alliance contributions is comforting as a means 
of providing immediate (albeit inaccurate) information about the reliability of the member of 
an alliance. Defence spending, as measured by the general defence spending pursued by an 
alliance member as a percentage (specifically, 2%) of their gross domestic product (GDP), 
fills this need reasonably well, and as a result, is perhaps the most politically expedient 
indicator. This marker, while only established as official NATO policy in 2004 (Rudzīte-
Stejskala, 2013, p. 169) is nonetheless especially popular for politicians examining NATO in 
the USA, wherein a dichotomous relationship is established based entirely on this 2% marker: 
members within the alliance either meet the marker and are considered valuable and reliable 
members, or fail to do so and largely become perceived as little more than free-riders 
(Techau, 2015, pp. 8-10). The difficulty of decreasing dependence upon the perceived 
reliability of viewing defence spending as a supremely reliable indicator has been 
exemplified by the difficulties in presenting alternative defence-spending related viewpoints. 
An alternative measure of determining relative contributions was developed by the Joint 
Analysis and Lessons Learned Center within NATO in 2011 but failed to catch on as an 
alternative means of examining defence spending due to the simplicity (and ambiguous 
nature, to curtail the potentiality of increased castigation) of the 2% GDP marker (Ibid, pp. 
10-11).  
The 2% defence spending expectation has not always been a part of NATO’s 
membership goals throughout its history, it has always been an integral facet of the Baltic 
states’ understanding of what membership in the alliance entailed. Striving to hit this 2% 
defence spending marker has always been a goal for all three of the Baltic states (Corum, 
2013, p. 11), and has been most successfully reached by Estonia, with Lithuania continually 
striving to reach the marker despite the recognition that its pursuit might not be economically 
feasible (Rudzīte-Stejskala, 2013, pp. 195-197). This determination was embedded ever since 
the Baltic states’ plan for ascension: The USA directly invoked striving for reaching this level 
of defence expenditure as a means of signaling financial and political determination to 
support the alliance (Ibid, pp. 169-170), a perspective which has been further reinforced as 
an integral aspect of status-seeking because of the 2014 Wales summit (NATO, 2014). 
Defence spending as a percentage of GDP is a politically expedient marker and a means of 
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reducing the status of NATO member-states to a simple binary of achieving respectable 
membership or perception as free-riders, but it would be erroneous for it to be considered the 
sole determinant of effective membership. In the cases of Estonia and Lithuania, their small 
and relatively similar sized economies (in relation to the rest of the NATO community, not 
their peer group) ensures that their financial contributions will be similar, comparatively 
negligible when larger member states such as the USA and UK are considered, and ultimately 
the least important of their individual contributions to the alliance. 
Committing personnel and troops to support international missions is another salient 
form of contribution that a member-state can make to the alliance. NATO’s scope of activities 
does not end with ensuring security for all its members under Article 5, but rather expanded 
following the end of the Cold War to include the pursuit of peacekeeping missions, with 
reconstruction and contributing to security developments in critical areas becoming another 
salient focus for the alliance (NATO, 2018). The International Security Assurance Force 
(ISAF) mission to Afghanistan under NATO’s leadership was an enormously important 
international mission effort which was considered vitally important for determining the 
prospects of the alliance in general (Maskaliūnaitė, 2014b, p. 224). It was also a mission in 
which the Baltic state played a pivotal part, not only in terms of general troop contributions, 
but in terms of their prominent roles: both Estonia and Lithuania adopted leadership roles in 
leading Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan’s Helmand and Ghor provinces 
respectively (Mölder, 2014, p. 65; Račius, 2010, pp. 190-191). Additionally, while not as 
significant a focus as their contributions to the ISAF operations in Afghanistan, Estonia and 
Lithuania have also contributed to EU and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Estonia, 2017). Variations in those contributions may either affect their contributions to 
NATO-led international missions or emphasize the degree to which a certain perspective of 
alliance valuation may lead to broader status accumulation via international mission 
contributions.  
The troop contributions made by Estonia and Lithuania to the EU’s international 
missions under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, which would later become 
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the CSDP) are also notable, in large part because the pursuit of security through the EU was 
historically not seen as vital as the pursuit of NATO membership. While attempts from 
Western elites were made to sway the Baltic states into perceiving the EU as an equally 
valuable security guarantee, they were never met with success: the generally held perception 
among all three Baltic states ascribed primacy to NATO’s value as a security provider (Tiido, 
2002; Paulaskas, 2013, pp. 54, 57). Contributions to the ESDP and its international missions 
and security cooperation are best understood as being very much like those made to NATO, 
with the primary distinction stemming from the perceived value of the organizations. 
Alliance membership in NATO was considered an optimal hard security guarantee, the same 
perception did not extent to the EU and the ESDP. Despite not being as vital for the security 
assurances required by the Baltic states stemming from alliance membership, these 
contributions should nonetheless receive some focus alongside those made to NATO.  
Niche contributions, the third marker, likewise differs from state to state. A 
significant niche contribution to be analyzed from both Estonia and Lithuania will be their 
respective Centres of Excellence. In general, Centres of Excellence represent critical 
contributions to NATO’s operations as an alliance for two reasons. They firstly provide 
concrete forms of support by providing a form of service and developing expertise in targeted 
areas which would otherwise be impossible, and secondly provide a vital way for member-
states to establish a niche specialty within the alliance by allowing them to act in a more 
responsible capacity as Framework Nations, with the additional responsibility of hosting the 
centre within its borders (Roberts, 2014, pp. 4, 9). Establishing such centers with Estonia and 
Lithuania operating as respective Framework Nations provides an exceptional means for 
status-seeking, as a means of providing their unique specialization to the rest of NATO.  
Estonia’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), accredited 
in 2008, predominantly focuses on cyber-security issues, such as preventing cyber-attacks 
and researching the development of cyber-warfare. (NATO, 2019). Lithuania’s Energy 
Security Centre of Excellence (ENSEC), accredited in 2012, provides a central research 
location for energy security issues as they relate to NATO missions and interoperability 
(Ibid). These niche contributions will be a particularly vital source of status-seeking, as they 
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provide a means for Estonia and Lithuania to status-seek through means considered 
domestically important, rather than more internationally homogenous forms of contributions 
such as contributing troops to international missions or spending more on defence. 
Measuring Alliance Valuation and Constructing the Coding Frame 
Both Estonia and Lithuania held favorable perceptions regarding the value of NATO 
membership for ideological and security purposes upon regaining independence, ensuring 
that its pursuit was an immediate foreign policy pursuit (Johnny, 2013, p. 5; Männik, 2013, 
pp. 21-22). This desirability was expressed publicly, with prominent politicians from Estonia 
and Lithuania declaring the desirability of NATO membership to their respective countries 
(Meri, 1997; Brazauskas, 1997), and their willingness to pursue domestic and security 
reforms to ensure that they could enter the alliance before formally joining in 2004. Had the 
value of joining the alliance not been perceived and stated in some form, they certainly would 
not have sought and committed to defence cooperation projects with the goal of attaining 
membership within the alliance at all, let alone continued to pursue status-seeking within the 
alliance upon achieving membership.  
As a vital aspect of status-seeking is that it is done in as visible and impactful a 
manner as possible (Renshon, 2017, p. 24; Dafoe et al., 2014, p. 376), the statements 
examined within this thesis’ coding frame will originate from domestic political elites and 
originate from highly visible events or reputable organizations connected to the foreign 
policy of Estonia or Lithuania respectively. The three sources utilized were transcriptions of 
statements made at meetings and press points at NATO events, articles written by Estonian 
domestic political elites published in the Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook regarding NATO 
(and EU) membership and security provisions, and transcripts made available from official 
statements released by Lithuania’s Ministry of National Defence. NATO-related transcripts 
were chosen as a marker of alliance membership due to the primacy of NATO as the most 
desired alliance for Estonia and Lithuania to join following the end of the Cold War 
(Paulaskas, 2013, pp. 54, 57). The EU is significant enough to examine due to its repeated 
invocation and means of providing another avenue for status accumulation but does have less 
significance as a traditional alliance for Estonia and Lithuania than NATO. All three sources 
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contain directly transcribed statements connected to relevant political figures, ensuring that 
the statements examined are not potentially distorted by third-party interpretations or 
summaries which bear some relevance to the perceptions of such figures regarding alliance 
valuation.  
The data collected was compiled over the course of Estonia and Lithuania’s ascension 
to and membership within in NATO. The earliest statements examined were made in 1997, 
during the Madrid summit which culminated in the ascension of several Eastern European 
states (Brazauskas, 1997; Meri, 1997), as representing the beginning of a more pragmatic 
approach to NATO membership. With their ascension and the promise of a continued open 
door to NATO (Brazauskas 1997), future membership in the alliance became far more 
attainable (although difficulties rising from Russia’s acceptance of the Baltic states remained 
a salient concern) (Paulaskas, 2013, pp. 53-57). The most contemporary statements analyzed 
within the collected data are from 2017 to present an analysis which can be more effectively 
supplemented by backing literature and academic perspectives on Estonia and Lithuania’s 
alliance valuation (outside of the coded statements) and status accumulation. 
A caveat does exist regarding the value of publicly made statements, namely in the 
debatable salience of domestic opinion and its impact on decisions made regarding status-
seeking within alliances (Maskaliūnaitė, 2014a, pp. 45-46), but they still hold a considerable 
amount of importance for two critical reasons. The first is that Estonia and Lithuania are both 
democracies, and while domestic opinion may not be the most critical factor in affecting 
decision-making processes, the value of alliance contributions is still stressed and expressed 
in a manner meant to assuage the concerns of as many members of the concerned public as 
possible (Ibid, p. 46). The second stems from the fact that domestic audiences are not the 
only concerned actors: internal political discussions and developments, while far from being 
under NATO’s control, are nonetheless noticed and consulted upon (Vike-Freiberga, 2002). 
Responsible political figures concerned with security and foreign policy developments would 
certainly be concerned with how actors related to NATO might respond to certain statements 
alongside domestic figures. Additionally, it is important to note that the establishment of the 
coding frame is a means to ease the process of determining coded aspects of statements which 
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relate to those theoretical explanations. While it is enormously unlikely that a politician 
would directly cite or quote a relevant academic source when, for example, invoking the 
importance of avoiding stigma formation by contributing more in the form of defence 
spending, those ideas would nonetheless find some presence through their expression, albeit 
indirectly.  
For the aforementioned reasons, this thesis will examine stated perceptions of the 
benefits of alliance participation and its impact on status-seeking via the case of Estonia and 
Lithuania as both NATO aspirants and members. Examining how data obtained from 
statements varied over periods of time also allow for variations in the status-seeking of 
Estonia and Lithuania prior to membership compared to after attaining it, due to the 
potentiality of an adjustment in status-seeking strategies following the attainment of 
membership. The security guarantees gained through NATO membership are vitally 
important to the alliance and its perception, and the potential difficulties of NATO cutting 
them (or other states unconcerned with status-seeking or even stigma management) off from 
those security guarantees would be considerable (Goldstein, 1949, p. 40). Additionally, 
examining status-seeking over a broader period allows for simultaneous analyses of the 
domestic and international environments facing Estonia and Lithuania during their time as 
NATO members (such as the potential impacts of the 2007 cyberattacks against Estonia and 
the 2008 financial crisis), precluding the possibility of mistaking such unexpected shocks as 
abrupt changes in status-seeking strategies.  
Considering the broad scope of the information stemming from speeches and other 
statements which will be analyzed, an effective and comprehensive form of qualitative 
content analysis must be pursued to ensure that any relevant information is gleaned from 
them in a cohesive and readily understandable manner. To achieve this goal, a descriptive 
coding frame has been constructed as a first-level means of discerning the presence of 
relevant portions within the statements and determining how they pertain to the benefits 
obtained from alliance membership. A descriptive coding frame organizes pertinent codes by 
identifying the topic or topics associated with the coded statements themselves, enabling 
insight to be gleamed on a specific topic from less specific content (Ibid, p. 88). By doing so, 
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patterns of thought intrinsic to the perceptions expressed via these statements become much 
clearer, revealing which Baltic state placed emphasis on which aspects of membership at 
different points in time (Ibid, pp. 3-6). The goal of this initial coding was to determine the 
frequency with which the value of alliance membership as a means of procuring security 
benefits, prestige possibilities, identity formation, or stigma management occurred within the 
data. 
Descriptive coding, however, is not quite enough to fully utilize a qualitative data 
analysis: it, as a form of first-level coding, is beneficial for providing an immediate 
introduction to the presence of specific themes and establishing groundwork for a more 
appropriate second-level coding (Ibid, p. 89). For this purpose, the initial descriptive coding 
was followed by further analysis utilizing focused coding, a means of determining the most 
pertinent codes for establishing more distinctive and appropriate themes from the descriptive 
coding results (Ibid, pp. 218-219).  
The scores for each document were established by the frequency of portions of 
analyzed transcripts or documents which reflected the pursuit of the goals inherent to alliance 
valuation. The presence of a material goal was predicated on the espoused benefits of alliance 
membership as providing a security benefit or guarantee (security), or alliance membership 
providing a means for the state to access a goal related to diplomatic or other forms of capital 
beyond what alliance membership would ordinarily entail (prestige). The presence of 
ideological goals was predicated upon sections wherein alliance valuation was espoused to 
prove the identity or normative power of either state (identity) or to prove that they could 
contribute responsibly and not lag behind other members (stigma management). The 
juxtaposition of these two categories of alliance valuation, and which score highlights a 
greater degree of perception frequency, indicates what espoused perception of alliance 
membership was stronger at a period in time. 
The values within coding frame itself is composed of the number of pertinent 
comments within the analyzed transcripts and documents. To ensure that they encapsulate 
fuller thoughts and statements of alliance valuation perceptions on the part of the speaker (or 
writer), the transcripts and documents chosen all contain statements which are at least one 
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hundred words in length. This both ensures that they contain enough material for a qualitative 
content analysis to be conducted and precludes the potentiality of less deliberated statements 
from potentially skewing the results. A total of twenty-three transcripts and documents are 
utilized within the qualitative content analysis: thirteen of them are from relevant Estonian 
political elites, and ten are from relevant Lithuanian political elites. Statements within these 
coded materials which pertain to the alliance’s value as providing a material or ideological 
benefit increase that category’s value by one, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of ten 
per document. A significant distinction between valuation of these two goals (in general or 
within a specific period) will be determined by a difference of at least two (if values for 
material or ideological valuation do not exceed five) or 50%, should one of the two alliance 
valuation categories have a value over five. To illustrate these constraints, a period wherein 
four portions of coded statements correlate with the valuation of material benefits of alliance 
membership and three correlates with ideological ones would not indicate a significant 
distinction between material and ideological benefit perceptions. In contrast, a period 
wherein six portions which correlate with ideological benefits compared to two which 
correlate with material benefits would be significant. The limitation of a maximum of ten 
coded statements per category per transcript (or document) is not one placed upon speakers, 
who could invoke both material and ideological goals as many times as necessary within a 
statement, but rather as a general precaution to ensure that the coding is being performed as 
accurately as possible, to preclude the possibility of two errors which might deleteriously 
impact the results.  
One such error would arise from categories which are too broadly defined to properly 
encapsulate only the material or ideological goal in question. The second would stem from 
mistakes arising from coding a statement which focused on a singular material or ideological 
goal multiple times. The first was addressed through an inter-coder reliability inspection, 
wherein the assistance of two additional persons to examine the results within the same 
coding guidelines was sought and attained. This ensured that the coded sections not only 
were appropriate but could be considered more reliable due to multiple persons reaching the 
same conclusion. Ensuring that sections would be coded the appropriate number of times 
entailed determining patterns not just from the frequency of specific words (such as the 
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invocation of belonging to the “Euro-Atlantic family” as indicating an ideological goal), but 
the longer statement they were associated with (with a longer statement indicating the value 
of belonging to the “Euro-Atlantic family” and proving democratic strength emphasizing the 
same ideological goal, but not showcasing multiple examples).  
To more effectively control for external events which could potentially act as 
intervening variables and provide a more comprehensive examination of the development of 
alliance valuation, the qualitative content analysis results will be examined in four distinct 
periods of time. These include 1997-2004, when Estonian and Lithuanian political elites 
espoused perceptions of alliance valuation upon seeing other states enlarge the alliance and 
deepened their pursuit of attaining alliance membership themselves, and formally entered the 
alliance. 2005-2008 is the second period, one of adjustment made tumultuous by cyber-
attacks launched against Estonia and the beginning of the Russo-Georgian war. 2009-2013 
is the third, a relatively less dangerous period in terms of actions taken directly against 
Estonia or Lithuania or taken by Russia against neighboring states. 2014-2017 is the fourth 
and final period of alliance valuation reflecting contemporary perspectives and Russia’s 
military intervention in Ukraine round out the significant periods of alliance membership for 
Estonia and Lithuania for the purposes of this thesis. 
A notable additional source of alliance valuation which would have been pertinent to 
Estonia and Lithuania, but was not included in the qualitative data analysis, was the 
respective national security concepts and strategies for both states. While very relevant for 
analyzing alliance valuation, they nonetheless were not chosen for inclusion for two salient 
reasons. The first is due to their length in comparison to the other data: the length of the 
material contained within far exceeds the comparatively shorter transcripts and documents 
from the Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook and official statements released by Lithuania’s 
Ministry of National Defence (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2011; Ministry of National 
Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, 2002). As a result, the alliance valuation results from 
a qualitative content analysis would overwhelmingly favor the material within those strategic 
documents, as compared to statements made by relevant political elites. The second is that 
these documents contain a much more in-depth and comprehensive examination of material 
and ideological value within NATO and the EU. An analysis of transcripts and shorter 
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publications provides a narrower focus on alliance valuation and which aspects are most 
favorable, in comparison to a broader examination which would be far more likely to contain 
all related information without as much of a need to emphasize certain aspects of alliance 
valuation. 
Conclusion 
As similar as Estonia and Lithuania are as members of the same peer group, their 
status-seeking paths and strategies as pertaining to NATO and, to a lesser extent, other 
international organizations such as the EU and UN, have varied to a respectable degree. The 
methodology and coding frame detailed above indicate how alliance valuation will be 
measured and ascertained. It, alongside status accumulation indicators (personnel 
international mission contributions, defence spending as a percentage of GDP, and niche 
contributions) will be examined to see how alliance valuation correlates with status 
accumulation. The following chapter will primarily be concerned with Estonia’s experiences 
within NATO, and how its alliance valuation and status accumulation patterns developed 
over the course of its membership.  
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Chapter Three: Estonia 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine Estonia’s alliance valuation and status accumulation 
patterns within NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU and the UN. The first section of this 
chapter will focus on Estonia’s alliance valuation over the course of its earlier pursuits of 
NATO and EU membership and time spent as a full member of both alliances until 2017. Its 
alliance valuation patterns will be discerned through a qualitative content analysis of 
transcripts and documents originating from relevant political actors, to discern the degree to 
which material and ideological goals and benefits were stressed alongside alliance 
membership. The second section of this chapter will analyze Estonia’s status accumulation 
patterns, as measured by its participation in international missions with NATO, the EU, and 
the UN, its defence spending patterns, and its development of niche capabilities within the 
alliance. The chapter will conclude by determining the degree of correlation between 
Estonia’s alliance valuation and status accumulation patterns, to discern the impact that 
certain alliance valuation patterns had on the state’s pursuit of status accumulation. 
Estonia’s Alliance Valuation 
Estonia, the smallest in terms of physical size and access to resources of the Baltic 
states, has nonetheless found a large amount of success through status-seeking as a member 
of NATO. Its status within the alliance as the foremost state for developing vital cyber 
security advancements through the CCDCOE (Ilves & Rasmussen, 2013), as well as its 
prominence as one of the few “elite” alliance members to meet the 2% defence spending 
target (Rasmussen, 2014), exemplifies it as an enormously reputable state within NATO, 
even when compared to its Baltic neighbors. These distinctions have not gone unnoticed even 
before achieving the optional defence spending target, with Estonia’s actions in the ISAF and 
rapid development distinguishing it as a “model alliance member” within the United States 
(Mölder, 2013, pp. 107-108). What espoused perspectives drove Estonia’s pursuit of status-
seeking to such an extent? 
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Table 1. Coding Frame Totals, Estonia’s Alliance Valuation 
Code: Estonia: 
Identity: 18 
Stigma Management: 11 
Ideological Total (Identity and 
Stigma Management): 
29 
Security: 29 
Prestige: 1 
Material Total (Security and Prestige): 30 
Statements Included: 13 
 
While the total value of codes indicating the perceived value of status-seeking within 
NATO for Estonia appear to indicate confluence between ideological and material goals 
(with a slightly higher focus on material goals), it does not provide a complete picture of 
Estonia’s experiences within the alliance with regards to historic events. The statements 
analyzed occurred between 1997 (at the Madrid summit, in response to NATO’ inviting three 
new states to join the alliance) and 2017, a significant length of time replete with 
environmental transformations. Fully understanding how alliance valuation stemming from 
Estonian political elites will require a more in-depth analysis of its transformations (or lack 
thereof) as time progressed. Alliance membership does not occur in a vacuum and taking 
these events into account may provide an explanation for a sudden change in alliance 
valuation or status accumulation. For this purpose, the deeper analysis of the results of the 
coding frame will be analyzed from the four time periods mentioned previously (1997-2004, 
2005-2008, 2009-2013, and 2014-2017 to account for events which may have factored in to 
alliance valuation. 
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 Alliance valuation as espoused by Estonian political elites in the years leading up to 
membership highlights a predominant focus on material goals over ideological ones. The 
clear focus expressed by these actors when discussing the possibility of joining NATO was 
on the security benefits membership would bestow upon Estonia. These, for the most part, 
centered around the nature of the alliance itself, both as the “only hard security guarantee” 
available for them to pursue (Tiido, 2003) and its provision of security through enlargement 
creating a more secure environment for all of Europe, Estonia included (Meri, 1997). The 
expressed desirability of alliance membership was then predominantly predicated upon 
material goals, with the insurance of Estonia’s security and ability to affect security 
developments in Europe (Tiido, 2003) taking precedence over ideological goals. The 
ideological goals expressed as alliance valuation from Estonian political elites were less 
frequently expressed, but nonetheless were present in their stated perceptions. These 
ideological hopes stemmed from achieving ideological solidarity with the rest of Europe as 
equals with whom to discuss regional developments, as well as definitively breaking away 
from the negative perceptions they developed over the course of the Cold War (Ibid, Meri, 
1997).  
 Estonia’s attainment of NATO membership was received as a remarkably significant 
attainment from both materially and ideologically oriented perspectives. The espoused 
valuation of attaining alliance membership addressed both aspects of ideological goals. 
NATO membership as confirmation of attaining an exceptionally fulfilling ideological status 
was acknowledged alongside the need to continue acting responsibly in accordance with their 
newly attained membership (and the proactive steps Estonia had already taken to prove itself 
through international mission participation) (Ojuland, 2004; Jürgenson, 2004, p. 11). 2004 
also led to Estonia’s admission into the EU as a member on May 1st, shortly after their 
induction into NATO on March 29th, and a strong linkage was likewise espoused between 
membership into the two international organizations as alliances as a means of proving 
identity and creating a need to act responsibly (Ibid). Ultimately, attaining alliance 
membership in NATO and entering the EU was valued as firmly proving that Estonia was 
worthy of standing in solidarity and equality with the other members of the Euro-Atlantic 
community (Ojuland, 2004; Jürgenson, 2004, pp. 11-12). 
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 Material goals were likewise expressed to a similar frequency as ideological ones, 
particularly through security assurances. Alongside ideological solidarity came an 
acknowledgement of issues confronting Estonia that did not fall into the traditional purview 
of domestic threat assessments. While international mission participation had been pursued 
by Estonia (and the other Baltic states) before attaining NATO and EU membership, 
becoming a part of a larger group of states in solidarity drove their need to consider the global 
landscape ever further. Alongside the ideological gains from alliance membership and the 
elimination of perceived threats to Estonia’s territorial integrity came a greater need to 
examine “soft security” challenges, necessitating Estonia becoming more attuned to common 
and global security risks facing its new fellow alliance members as well (Ibid, p. 12). With 
these new security challenges came tremendous benefits, however. Domestic perceptions of 
NATO as the greatest security guarantor in Europe became more explicitly pronounced. 
NATO’s immediate and beneficial impacts on European security in general were present the 
day of (Ojuland, 2004), and these perceptions of the material benefits associated with NATO 
increased as the perks of alliance membership began coming into effect, with NATO 
airplanes beginning flights over Baltic airspace specifically mentioned as immediately 
coming into effect upon entrance (Jürgenson, 2004, p. 11).  
 The following four years Estonia spent adjusting to membership in NATO and the 
EU from 2005 to 2008 were vital ones for transforming Estonia’s foreign policy outlook and 
its feelings of belonging to the organizations. Comparisons between Estonia’s acclimation to 
NATO and EU membership with other member states were stressed as indicating Estonia’s 
entering the membership community (Ilves, 2007, p. 11), as was the overlap between NATO 
members and EU members as neighbors in a similarly ideologically-oriented community. 
However, that time was not entirely uneventful, and the immediate ramifications of the 
bronze-soldier incident and the cyber-attacks targeted against Estonia highlighted the value 
of alliance membership to Estonia with consideration to more traditional material concerns 
and contemporary ideological goals (Ibid, pp. 13-14). The solidarity demonstrated by the 
Euro-Atlantic community with Estonia was the most significant ideological marker and was 
perceived as indicating the definitive attainment of equality with other members, wherein the 
solidarity given by the Baltic state to these alliances was paid back by the rest of the 
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community (Ibid, p. 13). Some consternation was also expressed regarding their experience 
signifying some divergence in the supposed solidarity between NATO and the EU. While 
attaining membership in both organizations was (and remained) vitally important for 
showcasing Estonia’s Euro-Atlantic identity, there was also a realization that Estonia could 
highlight the need for greater solidarity between the two organizations and emphasize the 
need for them to deepen their ideological ties (Ibid, p. 14; Ilves & Scheffer, 2008). 
 This Estonian valuation of and desire to reinforce the solidarity between NATO and 
the EU was also predicated upon the perception of fulfilling material goals. Security garnered 
through this solidarity likewise underpinned its value to Estonia, especially in association 
with the establishment of the CCDCOE as a means for promoting the development of cyber 
security for and alongside the rest of the Euro-Atlantic community (Ibid). Previously 
expressed views of alliance valuation regarding material goals were still mentioned within 
these material perceptions of value, namely in the form of air policing in the Baltic airspace 
(Ilves, 2007, pp. 11-12). However, the indication following the events of 2007 was an 
indication of the perception of material benefits shifting toward more contemporary forms of 
security benefits in the face of a rapidly transforming foreign policy landscape (at least, in 
terms of what Estonia could most benefit from ensuring its protection from). The material 
goals concerning ensuring Estonia’s protection from external threats were expressed 
frequently following the cyber-attacks, alongside the perception of alliance membership as 
ensuring the successful maintenance of ideological goals: the resurgence of a physical threat 
to security did not diminish the importance of NATO and the EU as proof of Estonia’s 
worthiness and place within the Euro-Atlantic community. 
 These perspectives on the value of alliance membership intensified in the years 
following the cyber-attacks from 2009-2013. The constantly stressed linkage of NATO and 
the EU as two vitally important communities continues, with a more significant predication 
upon material goals, such as promoting the welfare of European “security pillars” and 
ensuring that the alliance continued to predominantly support European security alongside 
other missions, as well as the significant hard-power. capabilities NATO possessed (Luik, 
2009, p. 25). Traditional sources of material support from the alliance (such as the continued 
provision of air policing) (Ansip & Rasmussen, 2011) continued to play a role, alongside a 
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more contemporary reiterated source of material support from the alliance, namely, cyber-
security. The perception of alliance membership as a means of ensuring Estonia’s security 
through the promotion of future solidarity among the Euro-Atlantic community remained a 
salient material goal that Estonia strove for (Ilves and Rasmussen, 2013). Additionally, 
positive perceptions regarding the potentiality of strengthening of NATO and the EU leading 
to the successful deepening of trade agreements which would directly benefit Estonia were 
expressed. The specific form hoped for was the establishment of a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement between EU countries and the United States, which was simultaneously and 
explicitly stated to not be within NATO’s purview, providing a material benefit beyond the 
provisions of alliance membership from a larger state which could be attained via the 
continued promotion of NATO and the EU as transatlantic links to the United States (Ibid).  
 The perceived benefits stemming from Estonia’s continued membership in the 
alliance during this period more strongly related the promotion of ideological goals. A 
perception which was repeatedly reinforced during this time was of the need for all members 
to contribute their fair share, specifically with regards to the 2% of GDP defense spending 
goal. This was perceived as providing proof of highlighting the need for members to maintain 
the strength of NATO even during times of perceived security and was expressed alongside 
a more nascent view of Estonia highlighting its own capabilities as a responsible actor which 
kept its promises (and preventing itself from failing the alliance) by attaining this distinction 
(Ansip & Rasmussen, 2011). This espoused perception of an ideological goal which could 
be attained through alliance membership was a swift and resounding success. This was 
signified with the perspective from Estonia on defence spending commitments switching 
from its own need to meet NATO’s commitments to the importance of this spending figure 
for all members, and expressed disappointment that Estonia was the “exception rather than 
the rule” when it came to small members and their likelihood of meeting the spending target 
(Ilves and Rasmussen, 2013). 
In addition to meeting those stigma-related ideological goals during this period, 
perceived hopes of continuing to improve Estonia’s image by deepening commitments to 
alliance membership also affected Estonia’s alliance valuation. The continued promotion of 
Euro-Atlantic ties and solidarity as a two-way street (with Estonia’s contributions to 
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international missions being matched by alliance support for them) continued to be a salient 
factor (Ansip & Rasmussen, 2011; Ilves & Rasmussen, 2013), and was further emphasized 
by means of distinguishing between Estonia’s less-than nascent adoption of membership 
status. Some consternation over the perpetuation of Estonia’s reputation as a “new European” 
state was expressed, as well as the hope for the perpetuation of their time in the alliance to 
cultivate a positive status as a fully European state and eliminate the divide between old and 
new European states within the Euro-Atlantic community (Ibid).  
Estonia’s alliance valuation in the period from 2014-2017, fittingly following the 
military actions Russia took against Ukraine in 2014, was more predominantly concerned 
with material provisions via continued security assurances than ideological goals. This did 
not entirely preclude perceptions of NATO as a valuable guarantor of ideological strength, 
but those perceptions were less muted than in previous years. The capabilities of the alliance 
as the only concrete to bind the Euro-Atlantic community together and keep both sides of the 
Atlantic thinking about one another was stressed as a particularly important goal (Ilves et al., 
2016), The need for the European community to maintain its solidarity was likewise 
important, but it was the perspective of a strong alliance keeping the United States in 
particular interested in Europe that most strongly expressed itself. 
 Material goals, specifically the maintenance and provision of security, were 
repeatedly and far more strongly stressed during this period specifically with regards to 
Russian actions. The distinction between the security environment following Russia’s actions 
and developments in Ukraine was invoked as a complete departure from the otherwise 
peaceful 25 years of peace Europe had enjoyed following the end of the Cold War, as well 
as the need for a strong and collective response to those military actions (Ibid). These 
abstractions of NATO and the EU’s collective security as guarantors of Estonian security 
were surpassed with the Zapad exercises and need for collective combatting of Russian 
propaganda distribution noted as directly affecting Estonia’s individual sense of security 
(Ratas & Stoltenberg, 2017). This perception of the material value of NATO as specifically 
helping protect Estonia’s sovereignty from Russian actions indicated the rising perception of 
alliance membership as an insurance policy against what had become a very real and salient 
threat to Estonia’s immediate security.  
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Table 2. Coding Frame Totals by Year, Estonia Alliance Valuation 
Year: Material Goals Coding Frequency: Ideological Goals Coding Frequency: 
1997: 2 1 
2003: 2 1 
2004: 6 6 
2007: 4 6 
2008: 2 2 
2009: 3 2 
2010: 2 2 
2011: 1 3 
2013: 3 5 
2016: 3 1 
2017: 2 0 
 
Table 2 indicates the pattern of alliance valuation expressed by Estonian political 
elites from 1997 to 2017. Confluence between the perceived necessity of alliance 
membership to attain material and ideological goals may not have occurred in every year, but 
for the most part, few major disparities between codes indicating the value of material and 
ideological goals occurred. The largest distinction between these material and ideological 
goals over Estonia’s time as a prospective and contributing member of NATO and the EU is 
found with regards to their expression and the form of success their attainment would take. 
Material goals developed the most with distinctions in the security environment, with 
subjects such as air policing over Baltic airspace (Jürgenson, 2004, p. 11; Ilves, 2007, pp. 11-
12; Ansip & Rasmussen, 2011) giving way to needs to address cyber-security challenges 
(Ilves, & Scheffer, 2008; Ilves & Rasmussen, 2013) and a resurgent Russia (Ilves et al., 2016; 
Ratas & Stoltenberg, 2017). Prestige related benefits were only directly invoked once with 
regards to deepening economic ties between the United States and the EU because of 
NATO’s success (Ilves & Rasmussen, 2013), an understandably desirable goal for Estonia 
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as a member of the EU but limited in comparison to other potential national interests Estonia 
might have (such as bi-lateral defense cooperation or gaining greater diplomatic access in 
Washington). 
Ideological goals, however, remained comparatively fixed and unchanging 
throughout Estonia’s membership. Goals which specifically focused on identity promotion 
fixated on the need for Estonia to showcase itself as a member of the Euro-Atlantic 
community through NATO and EU membership, with alliance membership providing a way 
for it to prove its innate European identity (Meri, 1997; Tiido, 2003; Ojuland, 2004; 
Jürgenson, 2004, pp. 11-12; Ilves & Rasmussen, 2013). Stigma management concerns were 
first predicated upon generally contributing enough to be considered an equitably 
contributing NATO member and precluding free-riding (Ojuland, 2004; Jürgenson, 2004, p. 
11; Ilves, 2007, p. 14; Ilves & Scheffer, 2008). These goals became more specifically 
predicated upon meeting defence spending commitments, specifically, meeting NATO’s 2% 
defence spending target (Ansip & Rasmussen, 2011), a shift which became much more 
understandable upon Estonia readily meeting that defense spending target (Ilves & 
Rasmussen, 2013). 
Estonia’s perceptions and expressed alliance valuation from relevant domestic 
political elites with regards to pursuing ideological and material goals remained relatively 
constant since the statements made in 1997. While the goals of some material and ideological 
pursuits shifted during that period, the expressed patterns between those two aspects of 
alliance valuation demonstrated a reasonably high degree of confluence overall. No period 
suggests a significant departure from this relative confluence with regards to the distinction 
established within the methodology (a difference of at least two for distinctive values which 
do not exceed five, or 50% if either one does). The degree to which this stability correlates 
with status accumulation, however, remains uncertain. Some statements made do contain 
some information regarding Estonia’s successes meeting certain goals which would be 
pertinent for status accumulation (Ibid), but appropriately summarizing Estonia’s history of 
status accumulation within NATO and the EU will require a closer analysis of more focused 
academic and primary materials. 
Estonia’s Status Accumulation 
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The first aspect of Estonia’s status accumulation to be analyzed is the most readily 
accessible one, its percentage of GDP spent on defence. This metric predominantly applies 
to NATO membership as a spending target: not meeting this spending goal will not lead to 
the dismissal of a member from the alliance but will preclude the development of one form 
of positive reputation as a member. Defence spending is one of the more pertinent expressed 
goals from Estonian political elites, with the pursuit of meeting the 2% spending target and 
its success being recognized domestically and within NATO as an achievement placing 
Estonia into a group of “elite” members within NATO (Rasmussen, 2014). Examining 
patterns of alliance valuation in the years before reaching this spending target reveals a 
constant perceived need to prove their competence as a member by pursuing equitable 
contributions (Meri, 1997; Jürgenson, 2004, p. 11). Considering Estonia’s status 
accumulation from achieving this target, and that its membership was predicated upon 
understanding its importance to it as an alliance member (Corum, 2013, p. 11; Rudzīte-
Stejskala, 2013, pp. 169-170), Estonia’s specific focus upon it is both completely 
understandable and puzzling. Few other alliance members meet this target, and other salient 
forms of contributions could have been pursued in search of alliance status accumulation.  
 Estonia, like the other Baltic states, was initially in no condition to pursue higher 
levels of defense spending following their re-attainment of independence. Their primary 
focus in terms of defence preparations was rebuilding from an extremely low military 
capability to a more respectable force (Corum, 2011, p.8) despite being in an economically 
precarious position. Their respective GDPs continued to dramatically decline until 1994, but 
the importance of rebuilding their respective militaries kept budgets relatively stable 
regardless: the security situations in all three Baltic states were far from ideal, and general 
feelings of insecurity buoyed public support (Rudzīte-Stejskala, 2013, pp. 172-173). Estonia 
had a considerable amount of domestic support for increased funding which remained 
constant into the mid-1990’s, well after the departure of Russian soldiers and the stabilization 
of their economy (Ibid, p. 170). Alongside this desire to increase their military viability was 
the understanding that greater security guarantees had to be pursued in addition to this 
national defense procurement (Corum, 2011, p. 10; Tiido 2002). 
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 A potentially large factor impacting the pursuit of increased defense spending in 
Estonia (and the other Baltic states) was the perceived necessity of ensuring that NATO 
viewed their initial acceptance as a net positive. One of the factors which would make a 
potential member state more desirable for alliance membership was, alongside the pursuit of 
various domestic transformations, the development of a military under the purview of a state 
both capable of contributing and willing to do so (Meri, 1997; Paulaskas, 2013, pp. 57-58). 
The process of contributing to the defence budget, alongside the understanding of the salience 
of the 2% target, certainly contributed to its perceived necessity for attaining the status 
necessary to ensure NATO membership, with the Estonian government committing to 
meeting that spending goal by 2002 in preparation for attaining membership (Rudzīte-
Stejskala p. 176). Considering this, in addition with the expressed alliance valuation patterns, 
it will be important to examine Estonia’s defence budget spending trends to see if any 
correlation can be found between material or ideological goal valuation in alliance valuation 
and defence spending. 
Table 3: Defence Spending per year as a percentage of GDP, Estonia 
Year: Defence Spending (% of GDP) 
1997: 1.047% 
1998: 1.067% 
1999: 1.287% 
2000: 1.376% 
2001: 1.502% 
2002: 1.667% 
2003: 1.743% 
2004: 1.7% 
2005: 1.6% 
2006: 1.4% 
2007: 1.7% 
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2008: 1.8% 
2009: 1.8% 
2010: 1.8% 
2011: 1.68% 
2012: 1.90% 
2013: 1.91% 
2014: 1.93% 
2015: 2.02% 
2016: 2.07% 
2017: 2.03% 
2018: 2.07% 
(World Bank, 2019c; NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p. 6; NATO Public 
Diplomacy Division, 2019, p. 8) 
Table 3 contains a record of Estonia’s defence related expenditures by percentage of GDP. 
The data from 2005-2010 and 2011-2018 was accessed from NATO’s records of defense 
expenditures by member state (with 2010 and 2018 recorded as estimates) (NATO Public 
Diplomacy Division 2011; NATO Public Diplomacy Division 2019). The data from 1997-
2004 was accessed from the World Bank’s dataset (World Bank, 2019c), a distinction which 
had to be made as Estonia’s first year as a member of NATO occurred in 2005. A pertinent 
factor which did impact NATO’s perception of Baltic (and Estonia’s) defence spending in its 
earlier years was a distinction in how spending was calculated in 2004. The capabilities of 
paramilitary forces (specifically on if they could realistically be deployed and were 
adequately equipped had to be considered before they were viewed as an actual part of the 
member-state’s defence, leading to discrepancies developing between Baltic perceptions of 
spending patterns and NATO’s findings (Rudzīte-Stejskala, 2013, pp. 170, 177). The Baltic’s 
wider interpretation of effective spending created some consternation regarding reported 
defence spending, and in the cases of Estonia and Lithuania, this discrepancy plays as much 
of a role in their not immediately meeting the 2% spending target. Internal measurements 
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before this change occurred had Estonia hitting the spending target in 2002 (Tiido, 2002) and 
Lithuania reaching 1.87% by 2003 (Rudzīte-Stejskala, 2013, p. 177).  
 What continued to support the growth of Estonian defence spending was a strong and 
consistent drive to continually contribute more. The lack of enforcement mechanisms within 
NATO provide some incentive to free-ride, as not meeting spending targets will not lead to 
the failing member-state’s removal from the alliance, and in the case of the other Baltic states, 
spending was not stressed as much as a result (Paulaskas, 2013, p. 62). Meeting this spending 
target remained a desirable goal for Estonia, and despite the economic difficulties caused by 
the economic crisis in 2008 for NATO members (and small states in particular) (Mölling, 
2012, pp. 3-4), their defence spending as a percentage of GDP was not curtailed. Rather, its 
pursuit became a firmer goal in 2010, with strong domestic action to ensure that it did not 
diminish (Rudzīte-Stejskala, 2013, pp. 193-194), and its attainment in 2012 stood out as a 
pivotal accomplishment for Estonia showcasing itself as a reputable NATO member despite 
being within a period of global economic turmoil (Paet, 2012). While there continued to be 
some discrepancies between internal and external measurements of Estonia’s defence 
spending (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2019), the overall trend continued to increase 
(save for a brief dip in 2011) until reaching the defence spending target in 2015, where it has 
remained relatively constant since. 
 International mission contributions, the second status accumulation indicator, have 
been pursued by Estonia shortly following its attainment of independence. Estonia gained 
membership in the United Nations in 1991, long before becoming a member of either NATO 
or the EU and contributed to peacekeeping missions in Croatia starting in 1995 
(UNPROFOR), Bosnia and Herzegovina starting in 1996, the Middle East starting in 1997 
(UNTSO), and Kosovo starting in 1999 (KFOR) (MFA Estonia, 2017; Estonian Defence 
Forces, 2018). These missions were significant as they reflected the desire of a newly 
independent Estonia to contribute to international peacekeeping and were in less actively 
dangerous areas. This ultimately led to the Estonian military contributing with decreased risk, 
and deployed forces did not experience direct combat while undertaking an international 
mission until 2003, as a part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Ibid, Molder, 2014, p. 65). Later 
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UN Missions undertaken by Estonia following their acquisition of membership in NATO and 
the EU include the MINUSMA mission in Mali, which began in 2013, and the UNIFIL 
mission in Lebanon (Estonian Defence Forces, 2018). This mission initially began with a 
temporarily deployed company under the purview of a Norwegian battalion within the 
BALTBAT development program from 1996 to 1997 (Lawrence, 2017, p. 18), with 
operations resuming with the deployment of another battalion in 2015 (Ibid, p. 20; Estonian 
Defence Forces, 2018).  
These missions taken under the purview of the UN were not altogether significant 
sources of troop contributions for Estonia. Apart from contributions made to UNPROFOR in 
Croatia, the larger battalion deployed in the late 1990’s to contribute to UNIFIL and garner 
peacekeeping training for Estonian forces, and the later deployment of 38 troops to once 
again support UNIFIL, Estonia’s contributions to UN missions have been considerably 
smaller than those made to support NATO and EU missions (although it does remain a 
significant contributor on a per-capita basis) (Lawrence, 2017, pp. 17-19). This does not 
indicate that Estonia does not ascribe value to UN mission participation. Quite the contrary, 
continued participation in UN peacekeeping operations when no alternatives were available 
was perceived as a valuable way to continue demonstrating Estonian resolve for remaining a 
global actor without overstressing its limited resources (Ibid, pp. 17, 20-21). It is 
understandable, however, given the comparatively smaller sizes of NATO and the EU, that 
more value would be placed upon pursuing operations within them (particularly NATO) as a 
means of status-seeking than the UN (Ibid, p. 19).  
Estonia’s participation in EU led missions have, despite the greater importance 
accredited to them in comparison to UN missions, attracted a consistent and more limited 
amount of contributions. The EU missions within which Estonia participated make up an 
extensive list, with a total of 13 overall, mostly concentrated in Eastern Europe in countries 
such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Kosovo), alongside support for missions in the Middle East 
(Iraq and Palestine), the Mediterranean, and Mali (Estonian Defence Forces, 2008; Mauro, 
Krotz, & Wright, 2017, pp. 46, 49-50, 56, 60, 62, 66-67, 71, 73-74, 79). However, the total 
amount of troops and personnel involved in these missions never exceeded double digits, 
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unlike the UN missions previously discussed. The total number of troops sent to support these 
missions has never exceeded 30 (Ibid, p. 92), and while that number trended upward sharply 
between 2007 and 2008, it only amounted to an increase of 11 available personnel. In terms 
of the contributions Estonia made toward supporting international missions, the EU’s 
subordinate position in terms of perceived capabilities of providing security in comparison 
to NATO continues to be applicable. Domestic consternation regarding the roles of the EU 
and NATO as security providers without significant overlap in mission pursuits and security 
provision diminished their perceived benefits to Estonia. Supporting two organizations and 
their different approaches in dealing with the same issue without working to increase 
cooperation between them became perceived as a wasteful proposition for Estonia (Tiido, 
2006, pp. 17-20), and the outcome of those concerns is evident in the distinctions to mission 
contributions. 
The most significant source of contributions and status accumulation Estonia made 
to international missions came through support for NATO missions, specifically, operations 
in Afghanistan in general and within the ISAF. Estonia’s contributions to the ISAF were 
significant, not just with regards to its status as a small member-state within NATO, but in 
terms of contributing beyond the level of even larger states by being one of the highest per-
capita contributors (and becoming the highest per-capita contributor in 2009) (Mölder, 2014, 
p. 65). Its willingness to send troops at the risk of heavy casualties to support the Provisional 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Helmand province in 2006, a considerably unstable and 
dangerous province, highlighted its considerable willingness to contribute to mission success 
(Ibid; McNamara, 2015, pp. 159-160; Paulaskas, 2013, p. 74). The decrease in Estonian 
personnel in Afghanistan within ISAF after 2014 is not indicative of a radical departure in 
status-accumulation strategies but the natural progression of the ISAF, which largely finished 
in 2014, leaving the smaller contingent of Estonian personnel to continue playing diminished 
support roles as necessary (Mölder, 2014, pp. 72-74).   
As highlighted in Table 4 (page 53), Estonia’s troop contributions to ISAF increased 
dramatically shortly after they began providing support to bolster the security within the 
Helmand province’s PRT. Contrary to their contributions to UN and EU missions, however, 
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the personnel numbers sent remained fixed at increased levels for several years, with a rough 
equivalent to the number of troops involved in UNPROFOR serving in Afghanistan for 
several consecutive years. This price becomes even more significant when the casualties and 
hundreds of injuries incurred during the ISAF are considered (Lawrence, 2017, p. 19; Mölder, 
2014, p. 66), indicating a willingness to continue proacted engagement despite the 
comparatively extreme risks.  
Table 4: Estonian Troop Contributions to the ISAF Mission by Year 
 
Year: Estonian Troop Contributions to ISAF: 
2004: 12 
2005: 23 
2006: No data available 
2007: 90 
2008: 130 
2009: 130 
2010: 150 
2011: 159 
2012: 154 
2013: 162 
2014: 156 
2015: 4 
2016: 5 
2017: 4 
2018: 5 
(Pernik, 2006, p. 203; Resolute Mission Support Placemats 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). 
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The reasons underpinning this enhanced contribution stem from the perceived vitality 
of participation in ISAF as a means to pursue effective status accumulation. NATO’s 
operations in Afghanistan were considered exceptionally vital as a means of proving that the 
alliance could operate successfully in a post-Cold-War environment (Maskaliūnaitė, 2014b, 
p. 224). Additionally, the nature of the operations in Afghanistan highlighted the perceived 
vulnerabilities of the alliance to the United States, specifically, growing concerns about free-
riding within the alliance in terms of contributing to metrics such as defence spending targets 
and making material contributions on the ground (Ibid, pp. 224-225; McNamara, 2015, p. 
157). These factors were known to political elites in Estonia, who perceived a larger and 
more credible contribution to the ISAF as an invaluable means of pursuing status 
accumulation in a time of transformation for the alliance (Mölder, 2014, p. 64). With 
considerations to the distinctions between NATO, EU, and UN missions in terms of 
importance to Estonian status accumulation, clear primacy was granted to NATO’s ISAF 
mission. Aside from the larger personnel contributions over a longer period, the mission 
became a priority mission in 2005 and became the largest recipient of funding allocated for 
international missions within the defence budget shortly afterward (Ibid). The ISAF mission 
ended in 2014, and while other missions through the EU and UN have been pursued, the 
amount of personnel involved has not reached the levels committed during the ISAF mission. 
The third status accumulation marker, niche contributions, is best exemplified by 
Estonia’s CCDCOE. The CCDCOE’s establishment in 2008 was appropriately timed 
considering the cyberattacks launched against Estonia in 2007. However, the 
conceptualization of such issues as particularly pertinent for Estonia to address had been 
around for a far longer period. Estonia’s development of its digital infrastructure and e-
governance system had been a consistent focus for the country since independence which, 
during that time, was starting to provide a plethora of benefits, such as the implementation 
of nationwide digital voting in 2007 (Hall & Trechsel, 2009, p. 498). As such, the attacks 
were less of an impetus to begin looking into developing viable cyber-security and defence 
options, but rather a sign of its increased necessity to deal with contemporary threats. 
A caveat of Estonia’s focus on cyber defence is its promotion as a means of further 
increasing defence cooperation between NATO and the EU. Estonia’s promoted strategy for 
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furthering the goals of the CSDP in 2017 included specifically focusing on cyber defence not 
just as a vital security problem to be addressed by the EU, but as a problem to be engaged in 
concert with NATO. Cooperation in general was stressed, but Estonia specifically stressed 
its abilities to contribute to furthering cyber security cooperation between both organizations 
“in particular”, and cyber security and defense has become an integral component of defence 
cooperation between NATO and the EU (Estonian Presidency of the EU Council, 2017, pp. 
1-2; European External Action Service, 2018, pp. 1-2). This desire to enhance cooperation 
between the two organizations is far from a contemporary one, with related desires expressed 
years beforehand (Ilves, 2007, p. 14; Ilves & Scheffer). Estonia’s positive reputation as the 
foremost NATO state in terms of cyber defence, especially due to their framework nation 
status with regards to the CCDCOE, provides a means for them to accomplish exactly that, 
further ensuring the perpetuation of their status within both communities.  
 The increasing financial support provided to the CCDCOE, alongside the 
increasingly broad scope of activities conducted through it, confirms its value as a vital 
source of status accumulation for Estonia. Its budgetary expenditures have only increased 
each year since its establishment, indicating confidence in its pursuits via the provision of a 
broader scope of operations and base of financial support from Estonia as its framework 
nation (National Audit Office, 2012, p. 2; National Audit Office, 2014, p. 2; National Audit 
Office, 2016, p. 5; National Audit Office, 2018, p. 4). The exercises conducted through the 
CCDCOE have also increased in prominence and scope, including Locked Shields, which 
began in 2010 and focuses on cyber defence training, and Crossed Swords, which began in 
2016 and focuses on cyber penetration training for member nations of the CCDCOE 
(Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 2019a; 2019b). In terms of support and 
scope, Estonia’s niche contributions to NATO and the EU through the CCDCOE follows the 
general trend of defence spending, in that its support and status accumulation pursued 
through it has contemporarily only increased. 
Correlating Estonia’s Alliance Valuation and Status Accumulation 
Estonia’s alliance valuation, as indicated by the results of the Qualitative Data 
Analysis in Table 2 (page 45), indicates that Estonia’s perceptions of alliance valuation did 
not remain consistent throughout its membership (and pursuit of membership attainment) in 
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NATO and the EU. Its earlier years of pursuing and attaining membership in NATO and the 
EU highlighted perceived desires to attain material goals (through the provision of security 
from those alliances) (Meri, 1997, Tiido, 2002). This developed into more confluence 
between material and ideological goals from 2004-2013, with perceived material benefits 
from NATO’s security guarantees and the ideological benefits of rejoining the Atlantic 
community serving as primary focuses (Ilves, 2007, pp. 11-12; Ansip & Rasmussen, 2011; 
Ilves & Rasmussen, 2013). More contemporary expressions of alliance valuation once again 
stressed the importance of material goals predicated upon security provisions with a newly 
perceived intense threat stemming from Russia (Ratas & Stoltenberg, 2017).  
To what degree did these shifting feelings of alliance valuation affect status 
accumulation patterns? Estonia’s status accumulation patterns (apart from international 
mission contributions, which declined when their mission they were contributing to in 
Afghanistan finished) reliably trended upward and remained consistent after 2008 (apart from 
a short-lived decline in their defence spending as a percentage of GDP in 2011). Examining 
the alliance valuation patterns in Table 2 (page 45) reveals that the divide between material 
and ideological perceptions of alliance value was small (16 material codes compared to 15 
ideological ones), highlighting the near-attainment of confluence between material and 
ideological alliance valuation despite shifts in Estonia’s security and economic environment. 
This meshes with the patterns indicated from 1997-2007, which likewise indicates 
confluence between the two alliance valuation patterns (14 material and ideological codes), 
leading to two conclusions with regards to the relationship between Estonia’s alliance 
valuation and status accumulation. 
The first is that Estonia was (and remains) ultimately more predisposed to value 
material benefits over ideological ones in more traditionally insecure periods of time (1997-
2003, before attaining NATO membership, and 2016-2017, following Russia’s military 
actions against Ukraine). Hybrid actions do not seem as readily trackable, as the cyber attacks 
leveled against them in 2007 did not lead to an equivalent focus upon material benefits over 
ideological ones, and extended periods of time of relative security do lead to a more salient 
focus on ideological pursuits instead of material ones (such as in 2011 and 2013). Estonia’s 
relatively small status within the Baltic peer group in terms of traditional, material status 
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indicators (such as economic size and population) would explain this trend. Attaining 
material guarantees would be a primary goal with that disparity in mind and pursuing status 
accumulation within for ideological reasons as a means of indicating belonging to another, 
less geographically contingent peer group and the development of a prominent status within 
their own peer group. Doing this provides a means for them to develop more favorable 
external perceptions, and, while not leaving one peer group for another, finding ways to 
distinguish themselves in terms of identity in both through pursuing highly visible status 
accumulation (Dafoe et al., 2014, p. 379; Renshon, 2017, pp. 23-24), a worthy pursuit when 
material goals as well as the mitigation of insecurity has largely been satisfied. 
The second is that confluence between material and ideological goals and benefits 
perceived within an alliance, at least in terms of broadly established trends in Estonia’s case, 
does indicate the increased likelihood of a state pursuing status accumulation within that 
alliance. Even external factors which impacted alliance valuation, such as economic 
downturns and military actions undertaken by Russia, ultimately did not skew alliance 
valuation toward overall favoring material or ideological goals by more than a single value. 
While it is important to understand how those events might impact alliance valuation on a 
yearly basis, it is likewise vital to discern a broader picture of the overall espoused value of 
alliance membership. For Estonia, that value was split almost evenly between the pursuit of 
material and ideological goals through alliance membership, a perspective that developed 
alongside its strong and continuous development toward pursuing greater amounts of status 
accumulation. 
Conclusion 
Estonia’s alliance valuation pattern varied during periods during larger amounts of 
traditional insecurity toward more material goals (such as before officially attaining 
membership and in the wake of Russian actions against Ukraine). However, despite variation 
between the two and external developments such as the economic crisis, it ultimately trended 
toward confluence between pursuing material and ideological benefits and goals through 
alliance membership. Coupled with Estonia’s consistent status accumulation efforts, this 
would strongly suggest that, at least in the case of the smallest state within a peer group of 
small states, expressed confluence between material and ideological benefits and goals within 
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alliance valuation among relevant political elites will lead to greater amounts of status 
seeking within an alliance. The next chapter will compare these results with those of the 
largest state within the Baltic peer group, Lithuania, to determine the similarity or differences 
between their alliance valuation and status accumulation patterns. 
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Chapter Four: Lithuania 
Introduction 
This chapter will, much like the earlier chapter’s analysis of Estonia examine 
Lithuania’s alliance valuation and status accumulation patterns within NATO, the EU, and 
the UN. The first section of this chapter will focus on Lithuania’s alliance valuation over the 
course of its earlier pursuits of NATO and EU membership, and time spent as a full member 
of both alliances until 2017. The qualitative content analysis of transcripts and documents 
originating from relevant political actors will be applied to Lithuania as well, to discern the 
degree to which material and ideological goals and benefits were stressed alongside alliance 
membership in comparison to Estonia’s. The second section of this chapter will analyze 
Lithuania’s status accumulation patterns, as measured by its participation in international 
missions with NATO, the EU, and the UN, its defence spending patterns, and its development 
of niche capabilities within the alliance through the incorporation of the ENSEC. The chapter 
will conclude by determining the degree of correlation between Lithuania’s alliance valuation 
and status accumulation patterns. 
Lithuania’s Alliance Valuation 
Lithuania pursued a similar path to Estonia regarding alliance membership following 
the end of the Cold War and resumption of independence, but the status accumulation 
trajectory it ultimately pursued has varied quite strongly from its northern neighbor. Its 
defence spending did not hit the expected spending target as quickly or readily as did Estonia, 
largely due to a very different domestic opinion on the target itself (Paulaskas, 2013, p. 62). 
Additional points of divergence can be found in the two other aspects of status accumulation. 
Its focus on Energy Security through its Centre of Excellence, the ENSEC, has been 
comparably less successful than Estonia’s CCDCOE, in part due to its later date of 
establishment and less prominent fixture within NATO. However, Lithuania did play a larger 
role in the ISAF, wherein it was tasked and admirably rose to the occasion of leading a PRT 
within the Ghor province of Afghanistan (Maskaliūnaitė, 2014a, p. 48). Estonia’s perceived 
relationship between material and ideological goals within alliance valuation indicated an 
overall confluence regarding stated perceptions of both. Table 5 indicates that, for Lithuania, 
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value stemming from the achievement of ideological goals were more frequently expressed 
within alliance valuation than material goals. 
Table 5. Coding Frame Totals, Lithuania’s Alliance Valuation 
Code: Lithuania: 
Identity: 36 
Stigma Management: 15 
Ideological Total (Identity and 
Stigma Management): 
51 
Security: 36 
Prestige: 0 
Material Total (Security and Prestige): 36 
Statements Included:  
10 
The results of the qualitative content analysis do indicate a much greater degree of 
expressed ideological benefits from alliance membership in comparison to those espoused 
by Estonian political elites in Table 1 (page 39). However, as determined earlier, the 
overarching depiction of alliance valuation does not necessarily indicate that those patterns 
remained constant for the duration of their alliance pursuit and membership. Examining how 
these patterns developed over time continues to be critical for developing a fuller 
understanding of Lithuania’s alliance valuation patterns. They will be fully explored within 
the four established and distinctive periods of time, 1997-2004, 2005-2008, 2009-2013, and 
2014-2017. 
The period from 1997 to 2004 was one predominantly predicated upon aspiring to 
and attaining NATO and EU membership, and to relevant domestic political elites, the most 
espoused benefits from attaining these memberships came from the ideological benefits they 
would impart. This is not to say that material benefits were not espoused at all: security 
benefits and guarantees were likewise stressed (albeit to a lesser degree) during this period. 
A significant factor of the pursuit of NATO membership was the security provisions 
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enshrined within membership which were notably equal and equitable for all alliance 
members (Brazauskas, 1997; Valonis, 2004; Paskas, 2004), alongside developing new means 
of countering more contemporary threats (Brazauskas, 1997; Valonis, 2004). In terms of 
preferable security choices, the espoused alliance valuation perception clearly highlighted 
NATO’s capabilities as a pertinent source of those material benefits. 
Ideological goals were more strongly espoused than material goals during this time, 
with an exceptionally close split between identity and stigma management goals. Alliance 
membership as a means of showcasing Lithuania’s normative growth as a state following the 
end of the Cold War was stressed as a particularly important goal (Brazauskas, 1997), as was 
officially demonstrating their attainment of equality with other alliance members (Paskas, 
2003; Valionis, 2004). Perceptions of attaining solidarity with the rest of a rapidly 
democratizing and unifying Europe under the purview of NATO strongly colored domestic 
statements espousing the benefits of alliance membership for Lithuania (Brazauskas, 1997; 
Valionis, 2004). Alliance membership was then understood as a means for Lithuania to 
highlight its capabilities as a state which had transformed following the end of the Cold War 
along with the rest of Europe, and formally codify its positive transformation with other, 
similarly democratic states throughout Europe. 
 Alongside this desire for alliance membership as a means of proving what had been 
attained developed a more pragmatic view of Lithuania’s abilities and need to continue 
developing through NATO membership. Chief among these were statements espousing the 
necessity of developing capabilities which would allow Lithuania to contribute more 
equitably to missions, air policing, and other alliance responsibilities (Brazauskas, 1997; 
Adamkus, 2004). Lithuania’s expression of ideological goals during this period ultimately 
presented a double-faceted perspective on what alliance membership would entail for their 
identity, at once reinforcing the progress they had made and the necessity of continuing to 
improve for the sake of better serving newly developing European solidarity. An interesting 
facet of these espoused perspectives was the primacy of NATO membership in comparison 
to EU membership as a means of encouraging cooperation in Europe. While membership as 
a means of reinforcing their belonging to the Euro-Atlantic community was a minor focus of 
these early statements (Brazauskas, 1997), yet the EU was not mentioned by name in the 
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statements made during this time, a stark point of distinction from Estonia (Ojuland, 2004). 
While NATO membership was the prime objective for both Lithuania and Estonia, this does 
suggest that membership in the former was comparatively stronger for Lithuania. 
The next period, from 2005-2008, led to the development of confluence between 
material and ideological goals within Lithuania’s alliance valuation. Material goals and 
benefits factored more heavily into domestic perceptions of the value of alliance membership 
more than they did during Lithuania’s pursuit and immediate attainment. The material 
benefits Lithuania continued to most strongly emphasize reflected NATO’s collective 
defense treaty under Article 5, as the most effective means available for ensuring a 
continuation of domestic development for Lithuania (and other alliance members) (Kirkilas, 
2005). The transformative capabilities of NATO in terms of providing security against 
contemporary and further reaching threats (such as terrorism and instability in Afghanistan) 
likewise factored into material alliance valuation, but the primary focus remained on 
emphasizing, and ensuring that the security benefits provided to Europe remained in place 
(Ibid). 
Ideological goals remained salient points of focus, with most of their benefits 
stemming from Lithuania formally adopting an identity as a new and capable member of the 
alliance. Notes of the need to meet responsibilities and commitments were noted alongside 
these. The continued demands of alliance membership notably highlighted the necessity of 
showcasing Lithuania’s capabilities to rapidly develop to meet the alliance’s demands and 
maintain proper contributions to equitably burden-share with other members, highlighting 
the value of the alliance as a means of showcasing responsibility and reliability (Ibid). 
Alongside these desires to mitigate potential concerns arising alongside Lithuania’s nascent 
membership status, however, were perceptions of notable benefits arising from their new 
status acquisition. Lithuania’s new member status afforded it the rights and privileges of 
other members and was indeed enormously positive as there were no “sacred cows” for it 
with regards to NATO (Ibid). With that in mind, Lithuania could stand as a more trustworthy 
member with regards to future alliance transformations, as it had no preconceived notions of 
what should specifically be maintained within NATO and could help organize positive 
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transformations, such as increasing cooperation between the alliance, the EU, and the UN 
(Ibid). 
The period from 2009-2013, following the cyberattacks launched against Estonia as 
well as the beginning of the Russo-Georgian war, led to a shift in Lithuania’s alliance 
valuation pattern. Statements within transcripts during this period indicated a much stronger 
inclination on the part of relevant Lithuanian political elite to perceive and note larger 
material benefits from alliance membership, rather than espouse its value as an effective way 
for Lithuania to achieve ideological goals. These material benefits predominantly centered 
upon NATO membership as a critically important facet of Lithuania’s security, particularly 
considering Russian war scenario training and return to historically unacceptable practices 
(Juknevičienė, 2011). NATO as a vehicle for inspiring and fomenting greater cooperation 
between Lithuania and the EU and Trans-Atlantic community in general was also heavily 
emphasized alongside an espoused willingness to continue contributing and showcasing 
Lithuania’s capabilities by contributing to international security (Olekas, 2013, Juknevičienė, 
2011). Emphasized alongside security benefits regarding alliance membership and deterring 
Russian aggression was the need to continue focusing on developing responses to less 
traditional threats, such as cyber defence and energy security. Invoked alongside alliance 
membership providing a more stable means of developing cooperative defence projects such 
as enhanced integration and air policing (Olekas, 2013), these means of deterring more 
contemporary forms of aggression were clearly perceived as equally salient a material benefit 
and desirable goal for Lithuania to fulfill (Juknevičienė, 2011).  
Ideological goals and benefits were definitively emphasized to a much lesser extent 
than material goals, but likewise held sway. Among them was a strong linkage between 
energy security as a material benefit to Lithuania from alliance cooperation and a marker of 
identity in Lithuania’s decision and resolve to establish the ENSEC (Ibid). Alongside this 
desire to showcase Lithuania’s capabilities in contributing to security solutions, its role as a 
normative marker within the alliance and the rest of Europe was likewise emphasized. The 
state of Europe, as perceived during this time, was one fraught with ideological tensions and 
the “cracking” of the European unity which had been developing since the end of the Cold 
War (Olekas, 2013). Lithuania’s role in contributing to NATO and the development of 
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cooperation with the EU and UN then highlighted its capabilities as a newer member and 
symbol of successful transformation in Europe: ideologically speaking, there was a perceived 
belief in the potentiality of Lithuania to attain and pursue a unique position as a bridge 
between the East and the West, reinforcing the waning Trans-Atlantic security in the face of 
renewed dangers from Russia (Juknevičienė, 2011; Olekas, 2013).  
The last examined period of statements from 2014 to 2017, following the 
development of Russia’s military actions against Ukraine, saw a resurgence of perspectives 
relating to the fulfilment of ideological goals and acquisition of ideological benefits. Material 
goals perceived by domestic Lithuanian elites as more achievable due to alliance membership 
stressed during this time predominantly focused upon the security guarantees afforded by 
NATO, both in terms of deepening defence cooperation between Lithuania and other states, 
and in ascertaining and countering the presence of new and unconventional threats (Olekas, 
2004; Grybauskaite, 2015; Velička, 2016). Ukraine stood out as another state included within 
this agreement, as a particularly salient testing point for European security and NATO’s 
capabilities. Standing with Ukraine in its time of need against Russian aggression stood out 
as a particularly important goal where Lithuania was concerned, as a pivotal test for ensuring 
that NATO’s security guarantees would continue to protect all of Europe, instead of leaving 
non-alliance members to fend for themselves (Velička, 2016).  
Ideological goals and benefits were stressed to a greater degree during this period, in 
large part due to the relevant Lithuanian political elites tying their experiences with joining 
the Euro-Atlantic community with the current situation Ukraine faced. The need and 
capabilities of the alliance to continue reaching out to Eastern Europe and expanding 
NATO’s open-door policy were stressed as being vitally important, due to the shared values 
of the alliance (and the Euro-Atlantic community) which Ukraine continued to embrace 
(Olekas, 2004; Velička, 2016). The alliance as the greatest form of maintaining this 
ideological strength through the pursuit of greater cooperative projects within a “family” 
beyond shared defence was likewise emphasized: the equitable and expansive nature of 
alliance cooperation was invoked as an important positive aspect of membership (Ibid). 
Alongside this cooperation was a sense of increased responsibility for commitments, in part 
for all alliance members, and in large part, for Lithuania to mitigate moving forward. While 
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Lithuania’s other forms of commitments such as their leadership role in Afghanistan with the 
PRT were mentioned (Olekas, 2004), the predominant concern regarding Lithuania’s 
development of status within the alliance came down to their failure (and desire) to reach the 
2% GDP defence spending target by 2018 (Grybauskaitė & Stoltenberg, 2015; Velička, 
2016).  
Lithuania’s alliance valuation, as gleaned through a qualitative content analysis of 
transcripts of statements made by relevant political elites and laid out in Table 6 (Page 66), 
has been less consistent in terms of attaining confluence between material and ideological 
goals, both in the overall pattern and in individual years. Overwhelming support for material 
goals (in terms of discerning significant distinctions between ideological and material goals 
and benefits within alliance valuation laid out in the methodology), compared to ideological 
goals occurred in 2011, largely coinciding with perceptions of an ascendant and aggressive 
Russia in the wake of the cyber attacks against Estonia and the Russo-Georgian war. 2004 
and 2014 indicated a greater focus on ideological goals and benefits within alliance 
membership, meshing with their initial attainment of membership in NATO and the EU, as 
well as the ideological benefits of alliance membership for appealing to Eastern European 
states, consolidating and expanding the values espoused as vital by the alliance.  
The most important material goals which were continually invoked over the span of 
Lithuania’s membership stemmed from defence cooperation within the rest of the alliance 
(Paskas & Robertson, 2003; Valionis, 2004; Kirkilas, 2005; Juknevičienė, 2011; Olekas, 
2013; Velička, 2016), and its capabilities of facing and surmounting new forms of threats 
(Valionis, 2004; Kirkilas, 2005; Olekas, 2014; Velička, 2016), highlighting less of a focus 
on increasing Baltic and Lithuanian security in particular and more toward the development 
of a broader European security which could safeguard against developing forms of threats. 
Alliance valuation which reflected deepening national interest and other goals not 
traditionally supported through the security assurances of an alliance, in contrast to the still 
mild presence they had in Estonian perceptions and statements, did not appear to any 
appreciable degree in coded statements from Lithuanian relevant political elites.  
Ideological goals and benefits espoused repeatedly throughout Lithuania’s 
membership reflected the theoretical underpinnings of both identity formation and stigma 
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management. The latter’s appearances in Lithuanian alliance valuation centered around 
meeting alliance expectations and commitments (Paskas & Robertson, 2003; Olekas, 2014) 
and ensuring that defence spending reached the 2% of GDP target (Valionis, 2004, 
Grybauskaitė & Stoltenberg, 2015; Velička, 2016) as a means of showcasing Lithuania’s 
abilities to overcome more negative reputation accumulation and prove its capabilities. 
Identity, as it related to Lithuania and its alliance membership, appeared in the form of 
formalizing its ascension from its Soviet past to becoming perceived as a free, democratic 
state and supporter of the values enshrined by NATO (and the EU) within the global 
community (Brazauskas, 1997; Valionis, 2004; Juknevičienė, 2011; Olekas, 2013; Olekas, 
2014). Much like Estonia, the value of alliance membership as confirming their identity as 
an equal and equitable member of the Euro-Atlantic community was truly invaluable. 
Table 6. Coding Frame Totals by Year, Lithuania’s Alliance Valuation 
Year: Material Goals: Ideological Goals: 
1997: 2 3 
2003: 1 2 
2004: 2 11 
2005: 5 5 
2011: 9 4 
2013: 3 4 
2014: 2 8 
2015: 3 2 
2016: 6 7 
 
 Overall, Lithuania’s perspectives on the value of alliance membership, while not quite 
different enough to equate to a significant difference (46 to 33, about a 40% difference) 
favored the fulfilment of ideological goals and attainment of those benefits through alliance 
membership more than material ones. Considering the differences in access to material 
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resources between Lithuania and Estonia, this result is hardly unexpected. However, 
considering Lithuania’s comparative status accumulation patterns and the three periods 
which did demonstrate more significant distinctions between perceptions of material and 
ideological alliance valuation (2004, 2011, and 2014), more pertinent questions to be 
addressed arise. How did these larger distinctions in alliance valuation from confluence 
impact (or fail to impact) Lithuania’s status accumulation, and how did they differ from 
Estonia’s? 
Lithuania’s Status Accumulation 
The first of the three markers of status accumulation to examine in Lithuania’s case 
is defence spending, a marker which affords it considerably less status than for Estonia. 
Meeting the defence spending target has, albeit to a lesser degree than Estonia, been 
expressed regularly as a salient goal for Lithuania in terms of highlighting its capabilities and 
mitigating stigma (Valionis, 2004, Grybauskaitė & Stoltenberg, 2015; Velička, 2016), but 
despite strong promises to raise defence spending to meet this target, it did not happen until 
2018 (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2019, pp. 3, 8). While meeting this marker is 
important for status accumulation, it nonetheless does not preclude examining historical 
defence spending trends with regards to Lithuania. Table 7 provides a complete historical 
overview of the state’s defence spending trends. 
 
Table 7: Defence Spending per year as a percentage of GDP, Lithuania 
Year: Defence Spending (% of GDP) 
1997: 0.747% 
1998: 1.229% 
1999: 0.97% 
2000: 1.217% 
2001: 1.362% 
2002: 1.271% 
2003: 1.121% 
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2004: 1.196% 
2005: 1.1% 
2006: 1.2% 
2007: 1.2% 
2008: 1.1% 
2009: 1.1% 
2010: 0.9% 
2011: 0.79% 
2012: 0.76% 
2013: 0.76% 
2014: 0.88% 
2015: 1.14% 
2016: 1.48% 
2017: 1.72% 
2018: 2.00% 
(World Bank, 2019c; NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p. 6; NATO Public 
Diplomacy Division, 2019, p. 8) 
 These trends indicate a relatively steady (albeit lower than Estonia, in terms of 
percentages) spending trend until declining considerably in 2010. This decline was countered 
by a resurgence in defence spending in 2015, with a greater emphasis on reaching the 2% 
target, considering both the fact that it rose to unprecedented levels shortly after and was an 
expressed domestic goal according to President Grybauskaitė in 2015. What’s rather curious 
about this decline is the timing underpinning its occurrence. Alongside the outbreak of the 
Russo-Georgian war in 2008 came an expressed period of insecurity in Lithuania, which 
sparked a renewed desire to specifically spend more on defence to reach the 2% target 
(Männik, 2013, pp. 36-37). What distinguished defence spending for Lithuania from Estonia, 
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which hit the spending marker comparatively more readily? And why did even the insecurity 
stemming from a resurgent Russia fail to increase defence spending? 
 The largest distinction between Lithuanian and Estonian defence spending stems 
importance placed upon reaching the defence spending marker. Unlike the strong domestic 
support in Estonia for continuing to increase defence spending, domestic reactions in 
Lithuania were comparatively more constrained following the attainment of membership. 
The most pertinent illustration of this comparatively relaxed attitude toward the target 
stemmed from President Grybauskaitė in 2004, who noted (in comparison to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in the same year) that raising the defence spending was not a priority, due to 
the unofficial nature of the spending target. As it was not written into any NATO treaty, and 
the need to showcase various forms of commitment were not as pertinent following the 
attainment of NATO membership the perception she espoused was that it did not apply to 
Lithuania (Valionis, 2004; Paulaskas, 2013, p. 62). Domestic consternation over defence 
spending was not only treated as less than a priority, but a detriment to Lithuania’s prosperity, 
with political tensions occasionally flaring between political parties over the importance of 
defence spending in comparison to other goals (Mölder, 2013, pp. 111-112). The economic 
crisis did not help matters in the Baltic states in general, and Lithuania’s decline shortly 
thereafter can best be understood not as a move away from status accumulation, but a shift 
in already concerned domestic spending priorities (Paljak, 2013, p. 224). 
 Lithuania’s slow increase of defence spending can best be understood then not as a 
lack of concern over Russia’s actions against Georgia (and allegedly against Estonia), but 
rather a continuation of political concerns over defence spending in general. In comparison 
to Estonia’s more considerable base of support and historical precedent, Lithuania had to 
contend with historical apathy toward increasing defence spending, in large part due to what 
were perceived as lacking responses by NATO to the East and a disproportionately large 
focus on Afghanistan (Mölder, 2013, p. 112). This consternation and hope for the alliance 
became more saliently expressed following Russia’s military actions against Ukraine, 
wherein the lack of support to the East was perceived as a problem that the alliance could 
solve, if only it engaged with the East more appropriately (Velička, 2016). Fittingly, while 
Lithuania’s strong support for supporting the alliance and commitments has been prevalent 
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since 1997, mentions of defence spending in general became more commonplace in 2015, 
following a domestic pledge to increase defence spending until it reached the target marker 
(Grybauskaitė & Stoltenberg, 2015). Due to larger domestic consternation in comparison to 
Estonia stemming from the defence budget in comparison to other spending needs, 
Lithuania’s pursuit of defence spending as a salient form of status accumulation was largely 
curtailed. 
 The lacking state of defence spending does not indicate a lack of status seeking on 
Lithuania’s part, but rather a distinction on their status accumulation strategies. Their 
personnel contributions to international missions, especially with regards to their leadership 
role in the Ghowr province PRT in Afghanistan during the ISAF mission, stands out as a 
particularly valuable means of both accumulating status and mitigating stigma arising from 
their other, less salient alliance commitments (Paulaskas, 2013, p. 76). This is not to say that 
the ISAF mission was their only contribution to NATO and other international missions. 
Much like Estonia, Lithuania contributed to international missions even before formally 
joining either NATO or the EU. NATO missions that Lithuania contributed to before 
attaining membership included ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania 
(Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, 2016). They also contributed to 
an EU mission in Macedonia during this same period, as well as the UN protection force in 
Georgia (Ibid). The ISAF, by far the biggest and most ambitious mission undertaken by 
Lithuania, came shortly after their attainment of membership and involved an unprecedented 
degree of contributions. Table 8 contains information on the number of troops sent to support 
the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. 
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Table 8: Lithuanian Troop Contributions to the ISAF Mission by Year 
 
Year: Lithuanian Troop Contributions to ISAF: 
2004: 40 
2005: No data available 
2006: No data available 
2007: 130 
2008: 260 
2009: 200 
2010: 165 
2011: 179 
2012: 237 
2013: 240 
2014: 99 
2015: 70 
2016: 13 
2017: 21 
2018: 50 
(Adamkus, 2004; Resolute Mission Support Placemats 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). 
As was the case with Estonia, Lithuania’s participation in ISAF was not meant to go 
on into perpetuity. The Lithuanian government’s plan for troop contributions to ISAF was 
for the state’s role to wind down in 2013 (Mölder, 2013, p. 113), providing a salient 
explanation for the otherwise inexplicably large diminishment of troops sent to Afghanistan. 
The initial process of leading the PRT was mostly spurred on by encouragement from the 
United States: a similar invitation had likewise been offered to Estonia and Latvia, which 
both declined to adopt that responsibility (Maskaliūnaitė, 2014b, pp. 233-234). Accepting the 
leadership role and committing to maintaining the security of the PRT was internally 
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perceived as a vital means of gaining experience and accumulating status for Lithuania within 
NATO. The hope for the results of leading the PRT went beyond just status within the 
alliance, however, as it provided them with a very welcome chance to showcase their 
capabilities as the largest Baltic state and their ambitions to ascend to regional leadership and 
attain a greater status within their peer group and potentially the post-Soviet space 
(Maskaliūnaitė, 2014a, pp. 51-53; Maskaliūnaitė, 2014b, pp. 240-241).  
Despite the large risks associated with committing troops and assuming a leadership 
position in an insecure area, casualties during the mission were relatively light, with only a 
single Lithuanian soldier’s death occurring in 2008 (Maskaliūnaitė, 2014a, p. 51). It would 
not be possible to draw any conclusions from a hypothetical situation, but the lack of fatalities 
stemming from troop contributions certainly would have helped ease the difficulties of 
maintaining levels of contributions. Additionally, the per capita costs with sending in 
Lithuanian troops did not rise to the same levels as Latvia and Estonia paid, highlighting 
Lithuania’s capabilities at accumulating status abroad without paying too much domestically 
(Paljak, 2013, p. 224). 21 Lithuanian troops remain committed in Afghanistan within 
Operation Enduring Support,  
Their contributions to EU missions, perhaps reflecting their more ambitious foreign 
policy designs, are slightly more varied than Estonia’s and include missions in states like 
Indonesia and Niger (Mauro, Krotz, & Wright, 2017, pp. 45-47, 52, 56, 58, 60, 62, 66, 69, 
71, 73-74, 79). However, while Lithuania might be more willing to contribute to EU missions 
in more regions of the world, their troop contributions fall short of those made to the ISAF: 
none of the EU mission locations led to the involvement of more than a handful of Lithuanian 
personnel (Ibid). They, much like the mission support provided to the UN mission in Mali, 
did not attract the same amount of contributions in the form of personnel support as did the 
ISAF (Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, 2016).  
In terms of international mission support, Lithuania’s contributions peaked within the 
ISAF, which was afforded a considerable amount of attention within alliance valuation as a 
reminder of Lithuania’s determination to continue equitably contributing to security 
(Adamkus, 2004; Juknevičienė, 2011; Olekas, 2014; Velička, 2016). Like Estonia, Lithuania 
placed a comparatively high amount of value on NATO as a military and security alliance, 
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both in terms of domestic and international hard security provisions. The primacy of their 
contributions to NATO, both in terms of the amount of personnel sent to support the ISAF 
and the details underpinning their pursuit of a leadership role in establishing a PRT in 
Afghanistan, highlights the value ascribed to it as a source of status accumulation and a key 
focal point for international mission contributions. 
Lithuania’s niche contribution to the alliance, the ENSEC, was very much like 
Estonia’s CCDCOE in that its establishment was predicated upon historical developments. 
Lithuania’s status as an energy island, reliant upon external sources of energy provision (such 
as from Russia) made pursuing more cooperative solutions to solving this dilemma 
particularly appealing (Vilpišauskas, Vandecasteele, & Vaznonytė, 2013, pp. 28-29). 
Deliberation over energy security in NATO became more commonplace in 2005 and 2006 
following the Russian and Ukrainian gas transit disputes (Molis & Vaišnoras, 2014, pp. 14-
15), making Lithuania’s establishment of ENSEC in 2012 of considerable importance to the 
alliance (Ibid, pp. 28-29). The ENSEC, like the CCDCOE, is also of paramount importance 
to Lithuania as a means of linking together their participation in NATO and the EU. 
Lithuania’s term as president of the EU featured a stronger focus on establishing energy 
security policies, in large part due to their desire to make the issue, and their interest and role 
in addressing it, more noticeable to the rest of the EU (Jurkynas & Daukšaitė, 2014, p. 25; 
Vilpišauskas, Vandecasteele, & Vaznonytė, 2013, p. 13).  
NATO’s nascent amount of progress in addressing energy security concerns prior to 
Lithuania’s establishment of the ENSEC provided a salient opportunity for Lithuania to adopt 
a leadership role in addressing energy security across the alliance (Molis & Vaišnoras, 2014, 
pp. 29-31). The official website and activities listed within, while not quite as expansive as 
exercises such as locked shields and crossed swords, nonetheless does highlight 
contemporary efforts at expanding alliance understanding and interactions with energy 
security. These include 12 workshops, courses, and conferences offered by or with the 
cooperation of the ENSEC since 2017 (NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence, 2016a) 
and numerous publications on various topics relating back to energy security and its military 
applications (NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence, 2016b).  
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Energy security as a topic within alliance valuation has been an important focus for 
Lithuania in conjunction with other hybrid threats to the alliance since 2011 (Juknevičienė, 
2011; Olekas, 2013; Olekas, 2014). The ENSEC has mentioned alongside energy security 
concerns as a positive response twice (Juknevičienė, 2011; Olekas, 2014), years close to the 
establishment of the ENSEC itself. The comparative lack of the ENSEC’s presence within 
alliance valuation and promotion via cooperative exercises with other cooperating countries 
to the CCDCOE indicates that, in comparison to personnel contributions to international 
missions and increasing their defence spending, the ENSEC and promotion of energy security 
are not perceived as equally salient sources of status accumulation. 
Correlating Lithuania’s Alliance Valuation and Status Accumulation 
 Lithuania’s alliance valuation, as indicated in Table 7 (page 67), was more divided 
between material and ideological perceptions of alliance valuation than Estonia. Its pursuit 
of ideological goals through status accumulation within alliance membership has been 
consistently more frequent than its material perceptions of value, with some years 
distinguishing themselves as highlighting significant differences in alliance valuation. The 
most significant splits between these perceptions of the value of status accumulation occurred 
in 2004 and 2014 (in favor of ideological goals) and 2011 (in favor of material goals). 
Reasons underpinning these significant differences in opinions can be gleaned through an 
examination of both the coded transcripts and the environment within which Lithuania found 
itself. There was a greater propensity among relevant Lithuanian political elites to espouse 
ideological benefits of joining NATO and the EU before officially attaining membership. 
Polling data suggested that, alongside the security provisions inherent to membership in both 
organizations, there existed widespread faith in their capabilities in promoting democratic 
values and securing the existence of a more equitable and accountable government in 
Lithuania (Kačinskas, 1998, pp. 3-4).  
 The periods in 2011 and 2014 reflect an evolution not only in Lithuania’s alliance 
valuation patterns, but in their perceptions of the security environment in Europe. The 
development of the ENSEC in 2011 and focus on energy security as a result factored 
considerably into Juknevičienė’s speech, as did the necessity of cooperative security 
responses to Russia’s military exercises (Juknevičienė, 2011). Expressed identity then 
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became a dichotomous relationship between Lithuania and the Baltic states, who had changed 
and become more peaceful through the adoption of liberal values, and Russia, which was 
continuing to threaten security in Europe much as it did in its past (Ibid). This perspective, 
in the wake of Russia’s actions against Ukraine, developed into less of a question of material 
distinctions afforded through cooperative action to emphasize the shared values and 
normative cooperation between members of the alliance (Olekas, 2014). Perceptions of 
NATO as simply not seizing the moment and properly utilizing its ideological capabilities to 
properly reach out to the people of Ukraine through their open-door policy were expressed 
alongside Lithuania’s own experience with joining the alliance, and the benefits of such 
ideological growth (Ibid).  
This is not to say that material and ideological values were not espoused alongside 
those years of significant distinctions between ideological and material goal valuation. It was 
the distinction in values between NATO and Russia which helped foment insecurity as 
presented in Juknevičienė’s speech (Juknevičienė, 2011), and the capabilities of NATO to 
afford new protection against contemporary insecurity was likewise afforded some 
consideration in Olekas’ speech (Olekas, 2014). However, there was a significant distinction 
in their respective manners of emphasis on material or ideological valuation, reflecting both 
the overlap between them as intrinsic portions of status-seeking and the multifaceted nature 
of potential alliance membership benefits. 
The disparity between Estonia’s relative confluence in terms of alliance valuation 
perceptions and Lithuania’s periods of significant distinctions between material and 
ideological valuation presents an opportunity to examine how those variations impact status 
accumulation patterns. What impact did those three years of significant distinctions have on 
Lithuania’s status accumulation? 2004 and 2014 marked periods of greater ideological 
valuation perceptions and marked important periods regarding their contributions to their 
most salient international mission, NATO’s ISAF, from their earliest commitment of 40 
soldiers (Adamkus, 2004) to their winding down operations following the end of the mission 
(Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, 2016). Table 7 (Page 67) 
highlights the relative lack of defence spending during these periods, with a downward trend 
from slightly over 1% in 2004 to marking the beginning of an increasing trend from less than 
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1% in 2014. Significantly increased material valuation of alliance membership occurred in 
2011, during a time wherein the defence spending budget was close to its lowest levels ever 
but Lithuania’s troop contributions to the ISAF were still relatively high (Table 8, page 71). 
Both the increased material and ideological valuations after 2011 would have been relatively 
close to the opening of the ENSEC, and both speeches made during those years mentioned 
the salience of energy security and the ENSEC by name (Juknevičienė, 2011; Olekas, 2014). 
Lithuania’s relationship between alliance valuation and status accumulation is 
ultimately one predicated upon valuing ideological benefits and the pursuit of likewise goals 
more than material ones. Apart from the period following the Russo-Georgian war and the 
cyber-attacks launched against Estonia, there were no periods of time which indicated a 
significant focus on alliance valuation as a means of attaining material benefits. What 
material benefits were mentioned predominantly fixated upon the provision of security 
through cooperation with the alliance against contemporary threats (Paskas & Robertson, 
2003; Valionis, 2004; Kirkilas, 2005; Juknevičienė, 2011; Olekas, 2013 Olekas, 2014; 
Velička, 2016). The potentiality of utilizing accumulated prestige to curry favor from larger 
states (such as the United States) to gain other material benefits or otherwise advance the 
national interest did not factor in to material alliance valuation. In contrast, ideological goals 
and benefits stemming from status seeking within alliances received a far greater amount of 
attention, both in terms of promoting Lithuania’s identity as a promoter and inheritor of 
liberal values (Brazauskas, 1997; Valionis, 2004; Juknevičienė, 2011; Olekas, 2013; Olekas, 
2014), and as a means of mitigating stigma and proving its worth despite more negative 
aspects of its reputation (Brazauskas, 1997; Valionis, 2004; Juknevičienė, 2011; Olekas, 
2013; Olekas, 2014; Grybauskaitė & Stoltenberg, 2015).  
Two conclusions can be reached from examining Lithuania’s alliance valuation and 
status accumulation patterns. The first is that Lithuania placed far more emphasis on 
ideological goals and benefits than did Estonia. Considering their hierarchical positions as 
members of the Baltic states peer group in terms of traditional status markers, this reflects 
Lithuania’s comparatively higher position in relation to Estonia. While still a small state, its 
position in terms of access to more material resources exceeds that of its Baltic neighbors, 
making the pursuit of material benefits less critically important in comparison to enshrining 
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its identity as a member of the liberal Euro-Atlantic community. The second is that, while 
factors such as the end of international missions and economic hardships influenced status 
accumulation quite heavily, significant distinctions in ideological alliance valuation does 
indicate a shift in status accumulation patterns, considering its occurrence during the 
beginning and ending of the ISAF, the most pursued source of status accumulation for 
Lithuania. While concluding that an increase in material or ideological valuation would not 
be a plausible conclusion to draw from the findings, it certainly does indicate that some shift 
in status accumulation will be pursued.  
Conclusion 
Lithuania’s alliance valuation pattern varied more than Estonia’s, in general toward 
ideological benefits, and during its oscillation between material and ideological benefits of 
status-seeking. These periods occurred from 1997-2004, wherein ideological goals were 
stressed during the pursuit of membership, 2009-2013, wherein material goals were more 
frequently espoused following the Russo-Georgian war, and 2014-2017, wherein ideological 
goals were again primarily pursued following Russia’s military actions against Ukraine. 
These substantial periods of contrasting alliance valuation distinguish Lithuania from 
Estonia, suggesting that Lithuania’s predominant alliance valuation and determinant of 
status-seeking and accumulation is driven by perceived ideological benefits and goals, rather 
than material ones. This thesis’ conclusion will conclude the contrasting alliance valuation 
and status accumulation patterns between Lithuania and Estonia and answer the two research 
questions within the research puzzle. Specifically, how the value of status-seeking within an 
alliance (alliance valuation) differed for Estonia and Lithuania as two differently sized states 
within the same small state peer group, and the impact that alliance valuation has on status 
accumulation patterns. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis explored status-seeking for small states within alliances to aptly determine 
answers to three salient questions. The first, how disparities in terms of status hierarchy 
within a small state peer group affect alliance valuation with regards to the primacy of 
ideological or material goals. The second, what perspectives of alliance valuation were 
present during periods of status-seeking. Finally, to better determine how status-seeking is 
defined and how it is pursued by small states within alliances. Examining small states was of 
pivotal importance to this thesis for two reasons. The first was more appropriately 
determining how states within peer groups of small states could be hierarchically ranked in 
comparison to one another, to preclude the potentiality of small state perceptions leading to 
inaccurate analyses through an assumption of complete homogeneity. In the cases of Estonia 
and Lithuania, examining both states as members of the same peer group allowed for the 
development of an analysis which compared distinctions between peer group members of 
small states, rather than members of markedly different peer groups or size groups. The most 
salient factor which divided them came down to their traditional status markers as relating 
back to their access to material resources, such as their overall GDPs and population sizes. 
The second was, considering the more limited resources small states would have in 
comparison to larger states within NATO and the EU (such as the United States, France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom), determining a means by which they could realistically 
status-seek and pursue status-accumulation given their more limited options to make 
contributions. 
 Estonia and Lithuania both pursued relatively similar tracks when it came to alliance 
membership and status-seeking within them. NATO was perceived as the most appropriate 
security guarantee, but EU membership and contributions to UN missions also played a role 
in their status-seeking and contributions. Estonia’s alliance valuation patterns achieved more 
confluence between the pursuit of material and ideological goals overall, with Lithuania’s 
patterns reflecting more significant support for ideological goals and significant disparities 
in alliance valuation in particular years. While the research was unable to discern status 
accumulation patterns for small states with regards to their alliance valuation based on 
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specific years, it does draw two important conclusions. One of which is that confluence 
within alliance valuation between the pursuit of material and ideological goals suggests a 
greater likelihood of consistent status-seeking for small states within alliances. The second 
is that significant disparities trending toward favoring ideological goals in alliance valuation 
will indicate a change in status accumulation patterns.  
In Lithuania’s case, these distinctions reflect a greater disparity regarding the role of 
alliances such as NATO and the EU with regards to defence provisions and Lithuania’s 
national interests. Whereas Estonia’s domestic political perceptions of the value of alliance 
membership and the need to fulfill certain criteria, such as with regards to defence spending, 
remained consistently supported by domestic political groups, Lithuania experienced a much 
different domestic environment. Consternation over the cost of equitably contributing to 
NATO and focusing attention away from areas of Europe which coincided with Lithuania’s 
national interests (specifically Eastern Europe) negatively impacted their status accumulation 
patterns. Their largest source of status accumulation contributions, their troop contributions 
and PRT leadership adoption within the ISAF, was motivated in large part due to their desire 
to fulfill their national interests with regards to adopting a more dominant status within both 
the Baltic peer group and within the larger post-Soviet space. Estonia’s status contributions, 
while perhaps not on the same level as Lithuania’s ISAF contributions, accumulated more 
steadily: their defence spending remained more consistent than Lithuania’s, and their 
CCDCOE remains more prevalent in terms of attracting other NATO members for broad 
exercises than Lithuania’s ENSEC.  
This analysis of the domestic political space gleans insight as to reasons underpinning 
the two conclusions reached within this thesis. Confluence between ideological and material 
goals within alliance membership for small states is indicative of a consistent political view 
regarding the value of status-seeking and accumulation within alliances, suggesting that 
status accumulation patterns will remain consistent. Conversely, alliance valuation values 
which indicate substantial distinctions between desires to achieve material and ideological 
goals highlight internal consternation over the value of status-seeking to that small state and 
insecurity regarding the benefits of continuing to status-seek within alliances. More specific 
periods of material or ideological valuation did not seem to have as much of an impact as 
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larger general trends within alliance valuation, which is an understandable outcome 
considering that altering spending patterns or making salient contributions is not an 
instantaneous political process. 
Finally, with regards to status-seeking for small states, this thesis both more deeply 
defined and distinguished definitions within status-seeking and determined how it could be 
pursued by small states within alliances. Distinguishing terms associated with status such as 
reputation, status itself, prestige, and stigma provided a more concrete examination of how 
those terms have been used interchangeably when status has been deliberated in the past, and 
a more contemporary understanding of how they might be more homogenously applied and 
understood in relation to status-seeking. Further unpinning status-seeking from the territory 
of large states and more simplistic indicators, such as the acquisition of more symbolically 
important military equipment like aircraft carriers, allows for the incorporation of small states 
into the paradigm and to determine alternative perspectives on what status-seeking includes. 
Estonia and Lithuania illustrate the importance of determining a broader and more inclusive 
picture of status-seeking, considering how states might belong to multiple alliances and 
international organizations simultaneously. Such developments preclude the potentiality of 
reducing alliance membership to an overly simplistic and individualistic paradigm, allowing 
for more complete and fulfilling analyses of small states and their status-seeking in more 
contemporary settings and overlapping alliance memberships. 
Ultimately, the hypothesized relationship regarding confluence in alliance valuation 
between small states most aptly determines that status accumulation will be more likely to 
be consistently pursued when perceptions of status-seeking as the best way to attain material 
and ideological goals maintain a constant state of relative confluence. Periods of time 
wherein alliance valuation substantially differs between perceiving both as worthy goals 
indicate domestic insecurity or uncertainty regarding the value of alliance membership, 
suggesting future transformations in status accumulation patterns. Larger states in small state 
peer groups will ascribe more value to ideological goals over material goals than small states, 
but this distinction matters less than the attainment of confluence for states within the same 
small state peer group. 
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